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The Supreme Court has taken very different approaches to the question 
whether individuals have a right to make autonomous medical treatment choices, 
depending on the context.  For example, in cases concerning the right to choose 
“partial-birth” abortion and the right to use medical marijuana, the Supreme 
Court reached radically different results based on radically different reasoning. 
More recent developments, including last Term’s decision in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, have only highlighted the doctrinal confusion and the need for a 
resolution.  In light of this pressing need, the goal of this Article is to view all of 
the constitutional cases touching on medical treatment decisions as one body of 
doctrine, as no other scholar has done.  This new perspective reveals that there 
are in fact two distinct lines of constitutional doctrine touching on the right to 
make medical treatment decisions: the “public-health” line of cases, which em-
phasizes the police power of the state over individual rights, and the 
“autonomy” line of cases, which emphasizes individual bodily integrity and dig-
nity interests.  These lines of cases have grown up in parallel, appearing to 
represent airtight doctrinal categories while in fact addressing the same funda-
mental question.  In addition, courts have applied varying degrees of deference 
to legislative determinations of medical fact without any logical consistency, 
perhaps based on largely superficial determinations about what type of case is 
before them. 
This Article concludes that a constitutional right to protect one’s health 
should be consistently recognized; that the recognition of this right should not be 
artificially limited by excessive deference to legislative findings of medical fact; 
and that this right will have to be carefully balanced against the state’s real and 
legitimate interest in regulating the practice of medicine to protect the public. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1958, in a mostly forgotten case, the Fifth Circuit sweepingly 
pronounced that under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the State cannot deny to 
any individual the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method of 
treatment of his ills.”1  The court’s unqualified language may have been 
overly optimistic, however: nearly fifty years later, it is hardly certain 
whether, and to what extent, the government can interfere with individuals’ 
medical treatment choices. 
For example, in two cases decided just one year apart—one concerning 
the right to choose “partial-birth” abortion2 and one concerning the right to 
use medical marijuana—the Supreme Court reached radically different 
results based on radically different reasoning.  In the first case, the Supreme 
Court broadly recognized an almost absolute right of a woman to choose a 
particular abortion procedure when her physician believes, in the physician’s 
reasonable medical judgment, that the procedure is safer for the woman than 
any other available abortion procedures.3  Moreover, the Court refused to 
defer to the state’s finding that the outlawed procedure was never medically 
necessary, accepting instead the plaintiff’s expert testimony demonstrating 
medical need.4  In the second case, the Court took a dim view of the claim 
that patients have a right to access marijuana as a last-resort medical treat-
ment and deferred to Congress’s finding that marijuana had no medically 
acceptable use, despite defendants’ evidence to the contrary.5 
Courts continue to waver between two very different approaches when 
dealing with claims of a right to protect one’s health by making medical 
treatment decisions without government interference.  In Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,6 the D.C. Circuit 
 
1. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1958) (emphasis 
omitted) (holding that plaintiffs could challenge Louisiana’s prohibition on the practice of 
chiropractic medicine as a due process violation). 
2. I place the term “partial-birth” abortion in quotes because it is considered by many to be an 
inaccurate and political term, like “assault weapon.”  “Partial-birth” abortion is not a medical term 
and in fact did not, at the time states began adopting “partial-birth” abortion bans, refer to any 
particular procedure known to physicians.  The term is clearly intended to have vivid emotional 
impact, which is why abortion opponents prefer it to a term like “dilation and extraction” or 
“D&X.”  See, e.g., Gail Glidewell, Note, “Partial Birth” Abortion and the Health Exception: 
Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1095 
(2001) (explaining that the term is not medically recognized and was selected by abortion opponents 
in the hope that it would conjure up graphic images of the procedure, thus undermining public 
support for abortion rights); cf. Richard G. Kopf, An Essay on Precedent, Standing Bear, Partial-
Birth Abortion and Word Games—A Response to Steve Grasz and Other Conservatives, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 11, 12 n.7 (2001) (noting, as the judge who authored the district court opinion 
in Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Neb. 1998), that the imprecision of the term 
“partial-birth abortion” was “a big problem”). 
3. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000). 
4. Id. at 934–36. 
5. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC ), 532 U.S. 483, 490–93 (2001). 
6. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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initially recognized a constitutional right to access experimental drugs on the 
theory that a terminally ill patient has the right “to make an informed 
decision” regarding medical treatment that she and her doctor believe may 
prolong her life7—then reversed itself in an en banc decision.8  In March 
2007, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that seriously ill individuals 
had a substantive-due-process right to access medical marijuana, holding that 
there was no “fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a 
licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering.”9  
Moreover, the Supreme Court revisited the “partial-birth” abortion issue in 
the 2006 Term and appears to be fumbling toward a reconciliation of the 
radically opposing approaches it has previously applied, although many 
questions remain to be answered.  In the federal “partial-birth” abortion case 
just decided,10 the Court combined the language of deference with a result 
that still suggests the possibility of a constitutional right to protect one’s 
health in the abortion context. 
But the need for a resolution remains pressing.  And that need is more 
than just a doctrinal one—in fact, the right of access to one’s chosen medical 
treatment is poised to become an extremely important practical issue in our 
society as America’s population increasingly becomes an aging one that is 
likely to begin vociferously seeking access to new and controversial 
therapies.  The national debate sparked by the possibilities of stem-cell 
research, for example, may be a preview of the controversy to come—a con-
troversy that is centered not so much on the right to die, which was ascendant 
in the 1980s and 1990s, but on the right to try to stay alive. 
The question of when the state can dictate that certain forms of medical 
treatment are off-limits—or, put differently, when the individual has a 
constitutional right to protect her health by making autonomous decisions 
about medical treatment—spans a number of doctrinal categories, often 
themselves considered airtight compartments that are to some extent sui 
generis.  It arises in the contexts of abortion, medical marijuana, right to die, 
and access to non-FDA-approved drugs, among others.  Some of these cases 
obviously invoke clearly established constitutional rights, such as the right to 
privacy, which require courts to apply heightened scrutiny.  Others involve 
important governmental interests, such as the “war on drugs,” which tend to 
 
7. Id. at 477.  Several months after Abigail Alliance was decided, the FDA proposed new rules 
to make experimental drugs more widely available to seriously ill patients.  Expanded Access to 
Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 312); Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
8. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695.  The Washington Legal Foundation recently filed a certiorari 
petition to challenge the en banc court’s holding.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, No. 07-444 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2007), 
2007 WL 2846053. 
9. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007). 
10. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
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provoke almost knee-jerk reactions from courts in a rush to defer to 
legislative judgments.11  Yet the tendency to see each of these doctrinal 
categories as unique and self-contained has perhaps obscured the reality that 
all of them raise the common question of when the government can permis-
sibly intervene in the doctor–patient relationship to dictate an individual’s 
medical treatment options.12 
The goal of this Article, and one of its principal contributions, is 
therefore to view the constitutional cases touching on medical treatment 
decisions as one body of doctrine, as no other scholar has done to my 
knowledge.13  And indeed, this new perspective elicits some startling 
inconsistencies and surprising insights.  My investigation reveals that there 
are two distinct lines of constitutional doctrine touching on the right to make 
medical treatment choices.  The first is the “public-health” line of cases, 
 
11. See, e.g., Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movable 
type/archives/2005/06/commentary_just.html (June 6, 2005, 20:30 EST) (discussing Justice 
Kennedy’s “zero-tolerance” attitude toward drugs, which may shape his view of the other legal 
issues in a given case).  Denniston’s post was cited in Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?  
Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 770 (2005) (“Other 
commentators have been less charitable in their initial assessments, suggesting that Justice Kennedy 
may have views about drug use that eclipse his concerns about the traditional federal state 
balance.”). 
12. Of course, formulating the problem in this way inevitably raises the question of what 
constitutes medical treatment.  In this Article, I am contemplating only those cases in which both a 
patient and her physician have agreed upon a course of treatment, and the government wishes to 
prohibit that treatment.  Therefore, I am neither arguing that an individual has an unqualified right 
to do what she pleases with her body, nor am I questioning the authority of the state to forbid the 
practice of medicine by nonphysicians.  Rather, my argument relies in part on the constitutional 
importance of the physician–patient relationship.  See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) 
(finding the statute limiting access to abortion unconstitutional because, along with other problems, 
“[t]he woman’s right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician’s best 
judgment and the physician’s right to administer it are substantially limited”); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (emphasizing that the physical, psychological, and emotional aspects of 
terminating a pregnancy “are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will 
consider in consultation”).  But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992) (“Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter . . . 
it is derivative of the woman’s position.  The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override 
the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified . . . .”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 202–03 (1991) (holding that a regulation prohibiting federally funded family-planning 
services from discussing abortion did not impermissibly interfere with the doctor–patient 
relationship).  Moreover, the physician’s role (which itself incorporates the state’s power to regulate 
the qualifications of physicians) provides an important check on the individual’s exercise of a right 
to make medical treatment choices.  See Doe, 410 U.S. at 197 (arguing that review by a hospital 
committee of the decision to have an abortion is unnecessary because a woman would only choose 
an abortion “in accordance with her licensed physician’s best judgment”).  Perhaps further 
limitations might be imposed on the definition of medical treatment, such as a requirement that the 
proposed treatment have a minimum threshold of acceptance in the medical community. 
13. One law-review article from 1989 discusses a number of the cases considered here in 
arguing that the substantive-due-process right to privacy encompasses a right to make health-care 
decisions.  Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution: Reconciling Privacy 
and Public Health, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1989).  Many of the cases discussed in this Article have 
been decided since 1989, however, and have reshaped the doctrine considerably. 
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beginning with Jacobson v. Massachusetts,14 which dealt with the 
constitutionality of mandatory-vaccination laws.  These cases emphasize the 
police power of the state over individual rights.  The second is the newer 
“autonomy” line of cases, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,15 which 
emphasizes individual dignity and autonomy interests. 
In addition, a careful look at the cases in each line demonstrates that the 
degree of judicial deference to the government on issues of legislative fact—
that is, the extent to which judges accept the government’s view of matters of 
scientific or medical fact that bear on policy choices—plays an important but 
largely unrecognized role in explaining the cases’ differing outcomes.  Al-
though it is tempting to understand the level of judicial deference as 
reflecting the nature of the underlying constitutional right or doctrinal 
category (i.e., whether a right requiring heightened scrutiny, and therefore 
minimal deference, is involved), I demonstrate that the Court has decided to 
apply deference without any logical consistency, perhaps based on largely 
superficial determinations about what type of case is before it.  Moreover, the 
deference arises not in weighing the quality of the state interest or balancing 
it against the individual’s interests, but at the stage of deciding whether the 
constitutional right to protect one’s health exists at all, where such deference 
is particularly inappropriate. 
I therefore argue that a right to protect one’s health by making medical 
treatment decisions has already been recognized by the Supreme Court but 
that its application has largely been clouded by the problem of deference—
and I conclude that the deference issue must be confronted directly and 
considered on its own merits.  The question of deference in these cases 
usually boils down to the question of who decides whether a medical treat-
ment has therapeutic merit.16  I argue that legislatures are particularly ill 
suited to this task and that judges, while not ideally suited to making medical 
decisions, are in a better position to weigh the scientific evidence before 
them.  This does not mean, of course, that individuals will have an unquali-
fied right to obtain any medical treatment they and their physicians deem 
appropriate, but only that a constitutional right to protect one’s health should 
be consistently recognized; that the recognition of this right should not be 
artificially limited by deference to legislative findings of medical fact; and 
that this right will have to be balanced against the state’s real and legitimate 
interest in regulating the practice of medicine to protect the public. 
 
14. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
16. The notion of a constitutional right to make medical treatment decisions also invokes 
another question of “who decides”—namely, whether the patient or the doctor decides on the 
appropriate course of treatment.  That question, which is one discussed extensively by bioethics 
scholars, is beyond the scope of this Article.  In this Article, I assume that the doctor and patient 
have agreed on a particular course of treatment that in turn is prohibited by law. 
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Part II of this Article describes and analyzes Stenberg v. Carhart,17 the 
Supreme Court’s first “partial-birth” abortion case, and United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,18 its first “medical marijuana” case, 
in order to demonstrate the conflict at the heart of my argument.  Part III then 
traces that conflict to two opposing lines of constitutional doctrine, each 
touching on the right to make medical treatment decisions.  It culminates in 
an analysis of Gonzales v. Carhart,19 decided in the 2006 Term, in which the 
Supreme Court combined the language of public health and autonomy, while 
still failing to reconcile the competing approaches.  Finally, Part IV con-
cludes that although the Supreme Court has recognized a right to make 
medical treatment choices, legislative-fact deference has played a largely 
unacknowledged role in the inconsistent application of that right.  Part IV 
ends with some suggestions for how the right to make medical treatment 
choices and the corresponding legislative determinations of medical fact 
could be handled by courts in the future. 
II. Same Question, Different Answers: Medical Marijuana and “Partial-
Birth” Abortion 
This Part considers two recent Supreme Court cases decided in 
consecutive Terms—United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative (OCBC ) and Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I )—that took 
conflicting views of the right to make autonomous medical treatment 
decisions.  OCBC and Carhart I are examined at length not simply because 
of their importance to this issue but also because they are emblematic of the 
two radically differing approaches the Supreme Court has taken in this area.  
In particular, as explained at greater length in Part III, OCBC represents the 
public-health approach, and Carhart I exemplifies the autonomy approach.  
These cases grew out of distinct doctrinal lines, resulting in a glaring doc-
trinal inconsistency.  As demonstrated in subpart III(D), this tension was 
evident in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Supreme Court appeared to in-
corporate elements of both approaches, while issuing a procedurally modest 
opinion that left most of the inconsistencies to be resolved at a later date. 
A. Medical Marijuana and Medical Necessity 
In OCBC, the Supreme Court—while not facing the issue directly—
strongly suggested that it would be futile to press a claim of constitutional 
right to access marijuana as a form of medical treatment.20  In so doing, the 
Court assumed a highly deferential stance toward congressional fact-
 
17. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
18. 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
19. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
20. See id. at 27 (deferring to the Controlled Substances Act as an authoritative “regime 
specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, 
and in what manner”). 
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finding.21  Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in OCBC did not turn on 
the question whether individuals have a substantive-due-process right to 
make medical treatment choices, the case is highly relevant to that issue for 
two reasons.  First, the defendants had argued throughout the litigation, and 
the district court ruled on the claim, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment protected the right of seriously ill patients to choose marijuana, 
in consultation with their physicians, to alleviate their suffering.22  In 
addition, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in reaching the conclusion that the 
Controlled Substances Act contained no medical-necessity defense has im-
portant implications for how the Court might rule on the conceptually similar 
claim of a right of seriously ill individuals to choose medical treatment in the 
form of medical marijuana. 
The OCBC litigation arose out of the federal government’s attempts to 
enforce the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibition on distributing or 
manufacturing marijuana against the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Club, a not-
for-profit organization in California that provided cannabis to patients whose 
doctors recommended it in compliance with the California Compassionate 
Use Act of 1996.23  The organization defended on several grounds, including 
that the common law defense of necessity—styled “medical necessity”—
precluded enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act against them, as well as that the enforcement of the prohibi-
tion on medical use of marijuana would violate substantive due process.24  
The defendants had presented evidence, including expert testimony, 
demonstrating that cannabis may be the only effective treatment for certain 
patients for whom other treatments have failed, including some patients suf-
fering from serious conditions, such as AIDS, cancer, glaucoma, multiple 
sclerosis, and quadriplegia.25  The government, by contrast, submitted 
absolutely no evidence to refute the defendants’ medical position.26 
 
21. Id. 
22. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102–03 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(citing Defendants’ Supplemental Opposition Memorandum at 9, Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086 (No. 98-0085)), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 
190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
23. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC ), 532 U.S. 483, 486–87 (2001).  
The federal government had brought suit against the cooperative and its executive director, seeking 
an injunction against the cooperative’s activities.  The suit against the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative was one of six suits against cannabis dispensaries in California brought by the federal 
government and consolidated into one case in the district court.  Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1092–93. 
24. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–03. 
25. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d at 1115; Appellants’ Opening Brief at 13–14, 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (No. 98-16950).  A number of studies document 
the safety and potential medical benefits of cannabis.  See, e.g., INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA & 
MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 159 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999) (“Nausea, appetite 
loss, pain, and anxiety are all afflictions of wasting, and all can be mitigated by marijuana.”); 
Donald I. Abrams et al., Short-Term Effects of Cannabinoids in Patients with HIV-1 Infection: A 
Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Clinical Trial, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 258, 264 (2003) 
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The district court rejected the defendants’ arguments, including the 
substantive-due-process argument.  The court held that the defendants had 
failed to demonstrate the existence of a fundamental right to “a demonstrated 
and effective treatment as recommended by their physician that can alleviate 
their agony, preserve their sight, and save their lives.”27  The district court 
categorically rejected the notion that individuals have a “fundamental right to 
obtain the medication of choice,”28 even on a physician’s recommendation, 
and even assuming that marijuana was the only effective treatment for the 
symptoms.29  The court relied heavily on Carnohan v. United States30 and 
Rutherford v. United States,31 two circuit court opinions that rejected the 
claim that individuals had a substantive-due-process right to access Laetrile, 
a drug made from apricot pits that was not approved by the FDA but believed 
by some to be a cure or treatment for cancer.32  According to the court, 
patients might have a constitutional right to access treatment for pain or 
illness, but the “selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication, 
is within the area of governmental interest in protecting public health.”33 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit strongly encouraged the court to issue an 
injunction allowing the distributors to provide marijuana to those individuals 
who met the requirements of medical necessity.34  Consequently, by the time 
 
(documenting the safety of cannabis for HIV patients); David Baker et al., The Therapeutic 
Potential of Cannabis, 2 LANCET NEUROLOGY 291, 294–96 (2003) (documenting the benefits for 
sufferers of neurological and neurodegenerative disease). 
26. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d at 1115; Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 
25, at 15. 
27. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (quoting Defendants’ Supplemental 
Opposition Memorandum, supra note 22, at 9). 
28. United States v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, No. C 98-0085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999). 
29. Id. at *2, *2–3 (“If one does not have a right to obtain medication free from government 
regulation, there is no reason one would have that right upon a physician’s recommendation.”).  The 
district court had initially rejected the defendants’ substantive-due-process claims partly on the 
ground that it was inappropriate for the cannabis distributors to raise this argument as a defense to a 
suit for an injunction to enforce the Controlled Substances Act, suggesting instead that the issue 
would be better presented by an individual patient.  See Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 
1103.  When four individual patients intervened in the suit and requested a declaration that they had 
such a right, however, they fared no better.  Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, 1999 WL 111893, at *2–3. 
30. 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980). 
31. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980). 
32. See, e.g., Alistair E. Newbern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of 
State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575, 1591 
(2000) (noting that Laetrile proponents claimed that the drug taken in high doses slowed the effects 
of cancer).  See generally Charles G. Moertel et al., A Clinical Trial of Amygdalin (Laetrile) in the 
Treatment of Human Cancer, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (1982) (detailing the history of 
medical uses of Laetrile). 
33. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, 1999 WL 111893, at *3, *2–3 (quoting Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 
457 (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Osburn, No. C 02-939 AHM, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8607, at *6, *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2003) (rejecting “any protected, fundamental right to 
the choice of a particular treatment or medicine”). 
34. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
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the case reached the Supreme Court, the case primarily turned on an issue of 
statutory interpretation: whether the federal courts should recognize a 
common law defense of medical necessity to the criminal prohibitions of the 
Controlled Substances Act, although the language of the Act neither ex-
pressly provides for nor excludes such a defense.35  The defendants, citing 
Washington v. Glucksberg,36 had argued in their brief that if the Controlled 
Substances Act were construed to contain no medical necessity defense for 
seriously ill patients, it would be unconstitutional as violative of the patients’ 
substantive-due-process right to life and their corollary right to “be free from 
government interdiction of their personal self-funded medical decision, in 
consultation with their physician, to alleviate their suffering through the only 
alternative available to them.”37  The Supreme Court declined to reach that 
argument, however, noting that the court of appeals had not addressed those 
constitutional claims.38  Only Justice Stevens, who concurred in the 
judgment, obliquely noted that the question whether the medical necessity 
defense “might be available to a seriously ill patient for whom there is no 
alternative means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering”—that is, 
whether the defense might be recognized if a patient rather than a distributor 
had raised it—“is a difficult issue that is not presented here.”39 
Although the Court declined to reach the issue whether seriously ill 
patients’ substantive-due-process rights were implicated by the Controlled 
Substances Act’s blanket prohibition on marijuana, it seems plausible to 
draw some conclusions from the Court’s analysis.  First, one might suggest 
that the Court’s refusal to consider the substantive-due-process claim reflects 
its view of the merits of that claim.  The issue was clearly raised, both in the 
lower courts and in the Supreme Court briefs, and the parties had an oppor-
tunity to build an evidentiary record, so the Court could—and arguably 
should—have reached it.  Given that the Court found no medical necessity 
defense to the Controlled Substances Act, it should have considered the 
defendants’ claim that the substantive-due-process argument provided an 
alternative basis for affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision remanding to the 
district court for modification of the injunction against the distributors.40  
 
35. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC ), 532 U.S. 483, 490–91 (2001). 
36. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
37. Brief for the Respondents at 42–43, OCBC, 532 U.S. 483 (No. 00-151) (citing Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) and id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
38. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 494. 
39. Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens’s concurrence was joined by Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg.  Interestingly, this issue—essentially one of third-party standing—has not 
been controversial in the abortion context, where physicians and clinics routinely assert their 
patients’ right to a health exception, which is conceptually similar to the medical necessity defense 
at issue in OCBC.  See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (allowing Dr. 
Carhart to assert his patients’ constitutional right to a health exception). 
40.  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).  The Court suggested that the issue was raised by 
defendants only as an argument that the Court should avoid constitutional questions in construing 
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Since it brushed this constitutional point aside, it is possible that the Court 
thought it had no merit and therefore would not have changed the ultimate 
outcome. 
A second way in which the Court’s analysis of the statutory issue is 
relevant to the constitutional question lies in the Court’s treatment of the 
defendants’ medical evidence, which conflicts sharply with the Court’s 
treatment of such evidence in Carhart I.41  Despite the defendants’ submis-
sion of expert medical testimony showing the medicinal qualities of 
cannabis, which went uncontradicted by the Government, the Court deferred 
to Congress’s finding in the Controlled Substances Act that marijuana “has 
‘no currently accepted medical use.’”42  The finding that marijuana lacks 
medical benefit was key to the Supreme Court’s decision.43  Moreover, in 
response to the defendants’ argument that notwithstanding that finding, 
marijuana can still be medically necessary for certain patients, the Court 
simply stated that it was “unable . . . to override a legislative determination 
manifest in a statute.”44  Thus, the Court would also be likely to defer to the 
 
the statute, see OCBC, 532 U.S. at 494, but the issue was clearly not only raised in this posture, see 
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 37, at 42–49; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, 
OCBC, 532 U.S. 483 (No. 00-151), 2001 WL 300618. 
41. See infra subpart II(B). 
42. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 491 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000)).  The Controlled Substances Act 
categorizes drugs into different “schedules” according to their usefulness and their propensity for 
abuse.  Kathleen T. McCarthy, Conversations About Medical Marijuana Between Physicians and 
Their Patients, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 335 (2004).  In order to place a drug in Schedule I, either 
Congress or the Attorney General, acting on the recommendations of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, must find that the drug “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States,” that it “has a high potential for abuse,” and that it has “a lack of accepted safety for 
use . . . under medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C); see also Lars Noah, Challenges 
in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 58 (2003) 
(describing the scheduling system for controlled substances).  Schedule I drugs therefore may not be 
prescribed or distributed for any reason.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  A Schedule II drug is one that has a 
high potential for abuse, potentially leading to severe physical or psychological dependence, but has 
a currently accepted medical use.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2).  In the case of marijuana, it was Congress 
that placed the drug in Schedule I.  Noah, supra, at 59.  Attempts to reschedule the drug have been 
administratively pursued but have failed.  See id. at 60–61 (explaining how interdepartmental 
conflicts have contributed to the challenge of convincing the DEA and FDA to down-schedule 
marijuana). 
43. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“The main foundation 
for the Supreme Court’s position in OCBC rests upon Congress’[s] findings that marijuana has no 
currently accepted medical use.”), rev’d, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Noah, supra note 42, at 59 (noting that in OCBC, “the 
U.S. Supreme Court showed tremendous deference to the legislature’s judgment about the 
appropriate classification of marijuana” and that the “decision turned entirely” on Congress’s 
conclusion that marijuana lacked any currently accepted medical use). 
44. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 493.  Interestingly, Justice Stevens seemed troubled by this issue three 
years later in hearing oral argument in Gonzales v. Raich.  The following exchange between Justice 
Stevens and Paul Clement, arguing on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States, is 
noteworthy: 
JUSTICE STEVENS: Do you think there could be any state of facts on which a 
judicial tribunal could disagree with the finding of Congress that there’s no acceptable 
medical use?  Say they had a – say there was a judicial hearing on which they made a 
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legislature’s finding in a challenge based on the substantive-due-process right 
to make medical treatment choices.45 
Since leaving the question open in OCBC, the Supreme Court has not 
again addressed whether there is a due process right to access marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.  In Gonzales v. Raich,46 the Supreme Court decided that 
the Controlled Substances Act, as applied to the intrastate medicinal use of 
marijuana in compliance with the California Compassionate Use Act, did not 
exceed Congress’s Commerce powers, but the Court did not address the 
claim raised by the individual patients that they had a substantive-due-
process right to access the drug.47  As in OCBC, the district court in Raich 
had rejected the patients’ substantive-due-process claims on the basis of the 
Laetrile cases, Rutherford and Carnohan.48  On remand, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed, stating that there was no long-standing, well-defined right to access 
cannabis for medicinal purposes.49 
B. “Partial-Birth” Abortion and the Health Exception 
Unlike OCBC, Stenberg v. Carhart, the first “partial-birth” abortion 
case, arguably recognized a very strong form of a substantive-due-process 
right to make medical treatment choices.  In Carhart I, the Court appeared to 
recognize the nearly absolute right of a woman to choose the safest abortion 
procedure for her, even when other safe methods of abortion exist.  
 
contrary finding.  Would we have to ignore that?  Would we have to follow the 
congressional finding or the judicial finding if that happened? 
MR. CLEMENT: Well, it depends on the exact hypothetical you have in mind.  I think 
the – the judicial finding that I think would be appropriate, and this Court would not 
have to ignore in any way, is a finding by the D.C. Circuit that, in a particular case 
where there’s a rescheduling effort before the FDA, that the underlying judgement [sic] 
of the FDA refusing to reschedule is invalid, arbitrary, capricious.  That’s the way to 
go after the finding that marijuana is a Schedule I substance without a valid medical 
use in treatment.  This is not a situation in – and your hypothetical might respond to a 
different statute that raised a harder question, where Congress made such a medical 
finding, and then just left it there without any mechanism to adjust the finding for 
changing realities. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454).  Thus, even the 
Government’s attorney acknowledged the possibility of a “harder question” where Congress has 
made a scientific finding unsupported by current scientific evidence.  Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 
S. Ct. 1610, 1637–38 (2007) (highlighting the discrepancy between congressional and judicial 
findings on the medical necessity of “partial-birth abortion” and the practice of teaching the 
prohibited procedure in medical schools, and accordingly declining to defer uncritically to the 
legislative findings).  It is not clear, however, why the existence of an administrative process by 
which parties may seek rescheduling of a drug should make any difference in the degree of 
deference that courts owe to congressional findings. 
45. The en banc D.C. Circuit also read OCBC as relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim of a 
constitutional right to access experimental cancer drugs in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
46. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
47. Id. at 33. 
48. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 
49. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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Moreover, the Court showed little willingness in Carhart I to defer to the 
state legislature’s findings of medical fact, instead allowing the plaintiffs to 
challenge and ultimately defeat those findings with their own expert medical 
testimony.  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Carhart I recognized a powerful 
right, the existence of which it was barely willing to contemplate in the 
medical-marijuana cases considered by the Court almost contemporaneously. 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a 
Nebraska state law purporting to ban a procedure often referred to as 
“partial-birth” abortion, or more technically and accurately called dilation 
and extraction or D&X.50  Nebraska’s ban imposed civil and criminal sanc-
tions for performing an abortion in which the physician “deliberately and 
intentionally deliver[s] into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial 
portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the 
[physician] . . . knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn 
child.”51  The ban contained an exception allowing the procedure to be per-
formed if it was “necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is 
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury,” but it 
contained no exception allowing the procedure to be performed when neces-
sary to preserve the health of the woman in situations that might not qualify 
as life threatening.52 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the law violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process as set out in Roe 
v. Wade53 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,54 
for two separate and independent reasons.55  First, the Court stated that the 
law was unconstitutional because it lacked an exception allowing the proce-
dure to be performed when it is “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment 
for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother.”56  The Court had made 
clear since Roe v. Wade that such a health exception was required when the 
state regulates postviability abortions; because the Nebraska ban admittedly 
applied both previability and postviability, it was a fortiori unconstitutional 
without a health exception.57  Second, the Court held that the law was written 
so broadly and imprecisely as to sweep within its reach not only the D&X 
procedure, but also the much more commonly used second-trimester dilation 
 
50. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 927–29 (2000).  The procedure is also 
referred to as intact dilation and evacuation or intact D&E.  At the time Carhart was decided, 
twenty-nine other states had “partial-birth” abortion bans similar to Nebraska’s.  See id. at 983 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
51. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (LexisNexis 2007). 
52. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 921–22 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 1999)). 
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
55. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 929–30. 
56. Id. at 931, 929–31 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). 
57. The D&X procedure may be used as early as sixteen weeks’ gestation.  Id. at 927. 
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and evacuation procedure (D&E).58  The Court held, and indeed the State had 
conceded, that a law banning D&E imposed an undue burden on the right to 
choose abortion and was therefore an unconstitutional “undue burden” on the 
right to abortion under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.59 
Thus, the Court seemingly held that it is an independent constitutional 
requirement that any law banning an abortion procedure like D&X must 
contain an exception permitting the procedure when medically necessary.60  
In so holding, the Supreme Court in Carhart I stated that the Constitution 
protects against abortion regulations imposing “significant health risks,” 
whether those risks “happen[] to arise from regulating a particular method of 
abortion, or from barring abortion entirely.”61  Thus, Carhart I apparently 
held that a woman has a right not only to access an abortion whenever it is 
necessary to protect her health but also to access the safest method of abor-
tion for her. 
The State had argued that no health exception was required in this 
particular case because the D&X procedure was never medically necessary.62  
In support of its view, the State pointed to the testimony of its own medical 
expert, some amici, and an American Medical Association policy statement 
suggesting that the health benefits of D&X were questionable or even that 
D&X might entail special risks not present in D&E.63  There was also 
 
58. Id. at 935–45. 
59. Id. at 938. 
60. See id. at 929–30 (“The question before us is whether Nebraska’s statute, making criminal 
the performance of a ‘partial birth abortion,’ violates the Federal Constitution . . . .  We conclude 
that it does for at least two independent reasons.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 948 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the “lack of a health exception necessarily renders the 
statute unconstitutional” but adding that the law is also “unconstitutional on the alternative and 
independent ground that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability”). 
 Some of the Justices argued in dissent that the requirement of a health exception was not itself a 
separate and independent requirement but rather should be analyzed under the rubric of the undue 
burden inquiry.  See id. at 968, 965–68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a health exception 
was not required because the “marginal” safety differences between D&X and D&E “do not amount 
to a substantial obstacle to the abortion right”); id. at 1011 n.20 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the majority’s failure to analyze the health risks with respect to undue burden).  This view was 
largely rejected by lower courts, which believed they had the support of the Supreme Court itself.  
E.g., Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2006)); Planned Parenthood 
of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930).  In 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), however, the Supreme Court analyzed the lack of a 
health exception in the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act in terms of whether it constituted an 
undue burden.  See id. at 1637 (“The medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates 
significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does 
not impose an undue burden.”). 
61. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931. 
62. Id. at 933–34. 
63. Id. at 933–36. 
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testimony to the same effect contained in the legislative history.64  
Nonetheless, the majority rejected the state’s legislative view, asserting in-
stead that the record demonstrated that D&X may be safer than the 
alternatives in some circumstances; at a minimum, the evidence on the medi-
cal necessity of D&X was disputed.65  And in fact, the plaintiffs had 
assembled an array of expert testimony pointing to myriad circumstances in 
which D&X might prove safer than the alternative D&E procedure.66 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court set out the evidentiary standard that 
each party must meet in a challenge to a ban on a method of abortion that 
lacks a health exception.  Where the plaintiff can show “a significant body of 
medical opinion believes a procedure may bring with it greater safety for 
some patients and explains the medical reasons supporting that view,”67 the 
Court held, the law requires a health exception unless the state can show 
“that a health exception is ‘never necessary to preserve the health of 
women.’”68  In this case, the Court held, the plaintiffs had met their burden, 
and Nebraska had failed to refute the plaintiffs’ evidence by showing that the 
health exception would never be necessary.69 
In understanding the significance of Carhart I, it is important to 
recognize that Carhart I (like Carhart II, the second “partial-birth” abortion 
case) is not about the right to choose abortion in the usual sense.  For women 
affected by the D&X ban, their alternative is usually not to forgo the desired 
(or required) abortion but to have an abortion by a method that is at least ar-
guably riskier.  Carhart I is therefore not about a state intrusion on the 
constitutional right to choose not to become a parent; it implicates only the 
right to choose the particular method of abortion, or in my terminology, the 
right to make medical treatment choices.70  It is therefore unlike the Roe 
 
64. Id. at 1015–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing on L.B. 
23 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Leg., 1st Sess. 50, 64 (Neb. 1997). 
65. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 932. 
66. Id. at 932–33. 
67. Id. at 937. 
68. Id. at 937–38 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914 (No. 99-
830)). 
69. Id. 
70. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 
111 (2000) (noting that the law in Carhart I was “quite different” from that in Roe in that the D&X 
ban “did not completely conscript women’s bodies or channel them into narrowly circumscribed 
lives,” and that “the law, if narrowly construed, outlawed only a single procedure, leaving other 
methods of abortion unaffected”); id. at 109–14 (noting philosophical and rhetorical distinctions 
between the opinions in Carhart I and Roe).  This Article does not address the question of what 
sorts of concerns may be taken into account when deciding whether one procedure is safer than 
another—for example, mental-health concerns.  This is an area that has remained poorly defined in 
abortion law.  See, e.g., Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule?  
Women’s Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to Post-
Viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 799–800 (1999) (discussing the ambiguity 
of and debate over the meaning of “health” in abortion case law).  In general, the claimed safety 
benefits of D&X over other procedures pertain to the woman’s physical health. 
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health-exception requirement, which is motivated by the notion that the state 
cannot force a woman to suffer physical harm in order to serve the state’s 
interest in the fetus, even a viable fetus.71 
In the Carhart I situation, the state’s interest in potential life is not 
implicated because the fetus will not survive regardless of the method 
chosen.  Thus, Carhart I implicates only the woman’s right to choose a par-
ticular method of abortion, which her doctor has determined to be safest for 
her, despite the state’s desire to outlaw that procedure for claimed moral, 
health, or other reasons unrelated to fetal preservation.  Carhart I thus appar-
ently guaranteed the right to choose the safest abortion procedure, even when 
other safe procedures were available. 
Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Carhart I, took the majority to task for 
what he viewed as a failure to respect the worthy tradition of deference to 
legislatures on disputed issues of medical fact.  Noting legislatures’ “superior 
factfinding capabilities,”72 Justice Kennedy argued that the Carhart I 
majority “fail[ed] to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State to 
take sides in a medical debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at 
stake and even when leading members of the profession disagree with the 
conclusions drawn by the legislature.”73  Carhart I is therefore as notable for 
 
71. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986) 
(citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979)), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), abrogated in part by Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490 (1989).  In Colautti v. Franklin, the Supreme Court struck down on vagueness grounds a 
state statute requiring physicians to use the postviability method of abortion most likely to result in 
a live birth, so long as a different technique was not necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
woman.  Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390.  The Court also suggested in dicta that such a standard-of-care 
requirement might endanger the woman’s privacy rights as well.  Id. at 400.  The Tenth Circuit held 
a similar choice-of-method statute unconstitutional in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 
1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per curiam), where 
the court emphasized that “a woman’s health must be the paramount concern.”  Id. at 1504; see 
also, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and 
Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 698, 697–98 (2004) (emphasizing the “absolute primacy of 
women’s health,” which may not be traded off against fetal survival, in post-Roe, pre-Casey 
Supreme Court decisions); April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment 
of Pregnant Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 727, 727–
28 (2004) (discussing Thornburgh and stating that the law is unambiguous that “in the context of 
abortion, women have the constitutional right to put their own lives and health before that of their 
fetuses, even after viability”); Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicide 
Cases and the Heritage of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 863, 898 (1997) (“The state 
may not require a pregnant woman to sacrifice her health even for a viable fetus.”). 
72. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 970 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997); Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596–97 (1926); and Collins 
v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1912)); see also id. at 1017–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Nebraska Legislature had before it evidence suggesting that the D&X procedure is unsafe 
and that it is never medically indicated, and therefore arguing that “legislatures have been afforded 
the widest latitude in drafting such statutes . . . [w]hen a legislature undertakes to act in areas 
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties” (omission in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 369 n.3)). 
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its nondeferential approach to issues of legislative fact as for its apparently 
sweeping health-exception holding.74 
C. Summary 
While they differed in the specific legal questions presented, Carhart I 
and OCBC both raise the issue of whether individuals possess a 
constitutional right to noninterference with medical treatment choices made 
in consultation with a physician.  In Carhart I, the issue was whether a state 
law prohibiting a particular method of abortion must contain an exception 
allowing the procedure to be performed when it is, in the opinion of the 
woman’s physician, the safest method of abortion for a particular woman.  In 
OCBC, the issue was whether a federal law prohibiting manufacture, 
distribution, or possession of marijuana had to be understood to contain an 
exception allowing an individual to access the drug when it is, in the opinion 
of the patient’s physician, the only effective or most tolerable method of 
treating the patient’s illness or its symptoms.  Both cases, then, are about not 
just the right to access medical treatment to relieve pain but also the right to 
make medical treatment decisions. 
Though the cases were decided within less than a year of each other, the 
Court did not cite Carhart I in OCBC, nor did it appear to think that the 
approach taken in the former case had any applicability to the latter case.  In 
Carhart I, the Court recognized a broad right to choose one abortion proce-
dure when it has safety benefits over other procedures.  Moreover, in 
determining whether the procedure might have safety benefits, it allowed the 
 
74. Indeed, not only did the Court definitively recognize such a right for women seeking an 
abortion in Carhart I, it appeared to recognize that right as an absolute one.  The Court did not 
contemplate that any state interest would be sufficient to overcome the woman’s right to protect her 
health in this context, nor did it mention levels of scrutiny or standards of review.  For this reason, 
the Carhart I–Roe health-exception requirement is difficult to integrate into standard substantive-
due-process doctrine.  Of course, it is fair to say that “the Supreme Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence has been anything but a model of clarity.”  Marc Spindelman, Are the Similarities 
Between a Woman’s Right to Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right to Assisted Suicide Really 
Compelling?, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 775, 781 (1996); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Three 
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 64 (2006) (discussing the confusing state 
of substantive-due-process doctrine); Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 
U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 251–52 (2001) (“Thirty-five years after the Supreme Court first explicitly 
recognized a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, we are still grappling with 
understanding and articulating what that right embraces.” (footnote omitted)).  Nonetheless, the 
apparent per se rule articulated by the Court does not fit clearly into any of the available paradigms 
of substantive-due-process review.  Cf. David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy after 
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1160, 1159–62 (2001) (noting that the Court in 
Carhart I treated the lack of a health exception as a “stand-alone defect” rather than a burden to be 
considered within Casey’s “undue burden” framework and arguing that the Court thus applied a 
standard similar to strict scrutiny).  The Supreme Court does not always articulate a clear standard 
of review for constitutional claims, however, and has most notably declined to do so recently in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916, 1916–17 
(2004) (acknowledging the majority’s lack of an “explicit statement” pinpointing the standard of 
review). 
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plaintiffs to challenge the State’s view of the medical evidence, ultimately 
accepting the plaintiffs’ “substantial evidence” of health benefits associated 
with the procedure as sufficient to overcome the legislature’s evidence to the 
contrary.  OCBC is something like a mirror image of this paradigm, as the 
Supreme Court and the lower court peremptorily dismissed the claims of se-
riously ill patients seeking to access cannabis for medicinal purposes when 
no other treatment was availing.  Indeed, the Court noted that “the very point 
of [its] holding is that there is no medical necessity exception to the prohibi-
tions at issue, even when the patient is ‘seriously ill’ and lacks alternative 
avenues for relief.”75  The lower courts that considered those claims simply 
stated that no fundamental right was implicated.  Moreover, despite the fact 
that the patients in OCBC presented evidence, unrefuted by the Government, 
that marijuana may have legitimate medical uses and may be the only appro-
priate treatment for some patients, the Court refused to consider that 
evidence, finding itself to be powerless to override a conclusory and contro-
versial congressional finding.76 
III. A Tale of Two Doctrines 
What accounts for the puzzling difference in the Supreme Court’s 
analytic approaches in OCBC and Carhart I ?  In this Part, I argue that the 
tension between the two approaches to the constitutional right to choose ap-
propriate medical treatment can be traced to the fact that two distinct lines of 
cases, both implicating the right to make medical treatment decisions, have 
developed without merging.  I describe these two lines of cases as the public-
health cases and the autonomy cases. 
Both lines of cases consider the right of individuals to protect their 
health against the contrary claims of the state to regulate the individual’s 
chosen medical treatment.  Yet, they take sharply differing views of this right 
and of the individual asserting it.  The public-health cases take the population 
 
75. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC), 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 
(2001).  The injunction had created an exception for distribution to patients who: 
(1) suffer from a serious medical condition, (2) will suffer imminent harm if the 
patient-member does not have access to cannabis, (3) need cannabis for the treatment 
of [a] medical condition, or need cannabis to alleviate the medical condition or 
symptoms associated with the medical condition, and (4) have no reasonable legal 
alternative to cannabis for the effective treatment or alleviation of the . . . medical 
condition or symptoms . . . because . . . the alternatives have been ineffective . . . or the 
alternatives result in side effects which the [patient] cannot reasonably tolerate. 
Id. at 489 n.2. 
76. See State v. Corrigan, No. C0-00-2190, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 889, at *2, *2–4 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2001) (refusing to reconsider the state legislature’s determination that marijuana 
had “no currently accepted medical use in the United States,” despite the claim that the medical 
literature has come to recognize the therapeutic benefits of marijuana since that determination was 
made (quoting State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991))); id. at *3–4 (“Whether 
changed circumstances have occurred that would now warrant recognition of a medical necessity 
defense to a charge of possession of marijuana is for the legislature to determine, not for this 
court.”). 
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view, seeing sick individuals not so much as autonomous decision makers 
exercising control over their own bodies, but rather as public-health problems 
and thus as threats to others that can and indeed must be controlled.77  The 
public-health cases, of which OCBC is one, find their origin in the 1905 case 
of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.  The autonomy line of cases, by contrast, 
beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, treats the right to choose 
appropriate medical treatment as an aspect of the rights to bodily integrity 
and decisional autonomy.  These cases take the “individual” view of citizens 
and their bodies, emphasizing the personal nature of the decisions involved.  
Carhart I grows directly out of the autonomy line of cases.  Yet, different 
though the two approaches are, the autonomy cases nonetheless retain traces 
of public-health concerns, and the public-health cases occasionally voice 
autonomy-based concerns.  This overlap serves to demonstrate the interrela-
tion of the two cases—that they are indeed just two sides of the same coin.  
And in fact, Carhart II demonstrates the beginnings of a convergence of the 
two approaches, although leaving much to be desired in terms of actually 
reconciling them. 
In Part IV, I draw on the taxonomy just set forth to suggest that the 
Court has basically decided whether individuals have a constitutional right to 
make autonomous medical treatment choices based on its largely superficial 
categorization of a given case as an autonomy case or a public-health case, 
and that there are no satisfying doctrinal ways to explain the conflict between 
those two types of cases.  In addition, I argue that deference to legislatures, 
which often plays the decisive role in these cases, has been used in a simi-
larly reflexive manner by the Court and should be reexamined. 
A. The Public-Health Cases 
The public-health cases originate with Jacobson v. Massachusetts.  
They emphasize both the power and the duty of the state to protect citizens 
from threats to their health, taking primarily a “population” view rather than 
an individual view of sick persons and summarily dismissing individuals’ 
claims of a right to make autonomous medical treatment choices.  While 
some of the early cases, such as Jacobson and Buck v. Bell,78 involved state-
mandated medical or surgical interventions that the individuals wished to 
avoid—such as involuntary vaccination and sterilization—those cases set the 
 
77. Cf. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 11–14 
(2000) (explaining that unlike medicine, which prioritizes the well-being of individual patients, 
public health prioritizes the collective well-being of populations); ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 
243 (1997) (“The interest of the Jacobson [v. Massachusetts] case lies in the discursive process 
through which the unvaccinated body of Henning Jacobson is constituted a threat to society.”); 
Wendy E. Parmet, Terri and Katrina: A Population-Based Perspective on the Constitutional Right 
to Reject Treatment, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 395 (2006) (contrasting the perspective of 
constitutional law, based primarily in liberal individualism, with the perspective of public health, 
which is population based). 
78. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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stage for subsequent cases in which courts rejected patients’ claims of a right 
to access the treatment of their choice.79  The medical marijuana cases, 
OCBC and Raich, can be said to grow out of this line of cases. 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, often considered a “foundational”80 or 
“seminal”81 opinion in the field of public-health law, dealt with the state’s 
power to enforce a mandatory-vaccination law.  Since it was decided prior to 
the rise of modern substantive-due-process doctrine, it does not contain the 
modern rhetoric of constitutionally protected privacy rights.82  Nonetheless, 
Jacobson involved one of the most famous early confrontations between the 
assertion of an individual right to resist a state-mandated medical interven-
tion and a state claim of justification in the name of public health and police 
power.  In upholding the mandatory-vaccination law, Jacobson is striking 
and important for its deference to legislative judgments in the name of re-
specting the states’ traditional police power to protect the public.  At the 
same time, however, the extent to which Jacobson considers and validates 
personal autonomy interests regarding medical treatment is surprising.83 
Jacobson involved the criminal conviction of Reverend Henning 
Jacobson for refusing to be vaccinated against smallpox in compliance with a 
Massachusetts state law and a regulation of the Cambridge Board of Health.84  
While there is some confusion as to the exact reasons for Jacobson’s 
refusal,85 the opinion suggests that Jacobson feared an adverse health 
reaction from the vaccine, that he had been ill as a result of vaccination when 
he was a child, “and that he had witnessed a similar result of vaccination not 
only in the case of his son, but in the cases of others.”86  Before the Supreme 
 
79. See id. at 205, 205–07 (holding that the state could properly sterilize those determined to be 
“feeble-minded” to prevent the birth of “feeble-minded” children who might lead lives of crime or 
indigency); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding Massachusetts’s 
compulsory smallpox-vaccination program, citing a real and substantial relation to the protection of 
the public health and safety). 
80. GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 66. 
81. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health—100 Years After 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652 (2005). 
82. In fact, Jacobson was a Lochner-era case.  The doctrine of substantive due process was of 
course liberally applied in the Lochner era but largely to strike down laws on the grounds that they 
interfered with economic rights, not fundamental personal rights. 
83. Cf. Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, the Police Power, 
and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 741, 751 (1989) (discussing Jacobson’s 
simultaneous affirmation of the state’s power to act to protect the public and recognition of an 
individual right that could limit that power). 
84. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13. 
85. See, e.g., Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1203, 1207 n.22 (1995) (noting that Jacobson is sometimes miscited as a case of religious refusal of 
vaccination). 
86. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36.  Indeed, such reactions had apparently been documented in the 
medical literature existing at the time.  See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 347 n.43 (describing 
Edward Jenner’s original publication on smallpox vaccination as disclosing one case of a severe 
adverse reaction to the vaccine); Michael Willrich, “The Least Vaccinated of Any Civilized 
Country”: Personal Liberty and Public Health in the Progressive Era, J. POL’Y HIST. (forthcoming 
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Court, Jacobson argued that the mandatory-vaccination law was 
unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it was “hostile to the inherent 
right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to 
him seems best.”87  And indeed, Jacobson had attempted to introduce evi-
dence in the trial court demonstrating that vaccines are often impure and 
therefore dangerous; that vaccination can have harmful health effects on 
those vaccinated, sometimes resulting in death; and that it is difficult to pre-
dict the cases in which such adverse consequences are likely—but the 
evidence was excluded as irrelevant.88 
In upholding the vaccination requirement, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the notion that the states have broad police power to act in the 
interest of public health and safety, noting that individual liberty can always 
be subject to “manifold restraints” in the name of the “common good.”89  
Indeed, the Court said, “Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount 
necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of 
disease which threatens the safety of its members.”90  Moreover, the Court 
 
Jan. 2008) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (mentioning a 1902 medical journal report of 
deaths of nine schoolchildren following tetanus vaccinations).  Moreover, until mid-1902, 
approximately the time when Henning Jacobson resisted vaccination, vaccines were almost 
completely unregulated, and some vaccines that were ineffective or impure made their way to 
market.  Id. (manuscript at 8–9). 
87. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
88. Id. at 24, 36. 
89. Id. at 26, 25–26.  As Wendy Parmet has persuasively demonstrated, the term “police 
power” was historically understood to have a specific meaning, closely tied to the power and duty 
of state and local governments to protect health, and it was understood as an affirmative source of 
power that could limit individual rights.  Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The 
Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 478 (1996) 
[hereinafter Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner]; Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the 
Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q.  267, 272 (1993) [hereinafter Parmet, Health Care].  According to Parmet, this understanding 
began to change in the Lochner era, in which not only traditional public-health measures, such as 
the mandatory-vaccination law in Jacobson, but more social and less obviously health-related laws, 
such as laws pertaining to working conditions, began to be justified in the name of police powers.  
Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner, supra, at 495–97. 
90. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.  Lawrence Gostin has influentially suggested that Jacobson may 
be read not only as an affirmation of the police power but also as imposing limitations on that 
power, including requirements of necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.  
See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 67–69.  The last requirement, harm avoidance, may be read into 
the notion that a health exception should be implied in the vaccination statute.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 95–99.  The remaining requirements are arguably on less firm doctrinal 
ground, but courts have nonetheless frequently applied them.  See, e.g., Scott Burris, Rationality 
Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV. 933, 966, 937–38, 938 & n.11, 966–67 
(1989) (suggesting that Jacobson’s “doctrinal basis has eroded” and questioning why courts 
continue to apply the requirements derived therefrom).  At the same time, Jacobson has often been 
cited to demonstrate that the public interest may limit the scope of individual rights, rather than to 
demonstrate the limits on public-health actions by governments.  See, e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 742 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Jacobson in connection with 
the argument that an individual’s autonomy interests may be overridden by more important state 
interests in preserving life); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson for the 
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emphasized that “the legislature is primarily the judge” of that common 
good.91  Most strikingly, as discussed below, in its haste to protect the public 
health, the Court simply brushed over Jacobson’s individual claim that he 
had specific health reasons for wanting to avoid vaccination; thus, one com-
mentator has remarked that Henning Jacobson himself “disappear[s]” from 
the case.92 
The emphasis on the “common good” in Jacobson contrasts sharply 
with the individual-focused slant of the autonomy cases, as does its deference 
to the legislature’s scientific findings regarding the safety and efficacy of 
vaccination.  The Court agreed with the lower court’s decision to exclude 
Jacobson’s evidence, much of which was aimed at challenging the 
legislature’s findings regarding vaccination.93  The Court primarily relied on 
the well-established efficacy and salutary effects of vaccination to reject 
Jacobson’s attempt to shed doubt on the requirement, but it also noted that 
when there is doubt about a scientific issue, legislatures have the power to 
decide it: “We must assume that . . . the legislature of Massachusetts was not 
unaware of these opposing theories, and was compelled, of necessity, to 
choose between them.  It was not compelled to commit a matter involving 
the public health and safety to the final decision of a court or jury.”94  Indeed, 
quoting at length and with approval from the New York state court’s opinion 
in Viemeister v. White,95 the Court went so far as to say: 
The fact that the belief [in the efficacy of vaccination] is not universal 
is not controlling, for there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by 
everyone.  The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that 
science may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for the 
legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common 
belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious 
diseases. . . .  [F]or what the people believe is for the common welfare 
must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether 
it does in fact or not.96 
The legislature was thus entitled to deference, whether its conclusions turned 
out to be correct or incorrect.97 
 
proposition that there is no “unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases,” without regard to 
countervailing state interests). 
91. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
92. HYDE, supra note 77, at 243. 
93. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23–30. 
94. Id. at 30. 
95. 72 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904). 
96. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (quoting Viemeister, 72 N.E. at 99); accord Duffield v. Sch. Dist. 
of Williamsport, 29 A. 742, 743 (Pa. 1894). 
97. Accord State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (N.C. 1900).  But see Burris, supra note 90, at 961 
(arguing that Jacobson’s apparent deference must be read in light of the Court’s Lochner-era 
willingness to scrutinize laws carefully while claiming to apply rationality review, and arguing that 
“the Court’s reliance on the People’s right to choose vaccination as a health measure actually had 
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Jacobson would provide a perfect template for the deference exhibited 
by the opinions in OCBC nearly one hundred years later, except for a 
surprising turn that Jacobson takes near the end of the majority opinion.  
After rejecting Jacobson’s claim for a health-based exemption to the vacci-
nation requirement on the ground that confusingly, he “did not offer to prove 
that, by reason of his then condition, he was in fact not a fit subject of 
vaccination,” the Court went on to assert that some individuals would be 
entitled to a sort of health exception.98  The Court stated, in dicta, that in an 
“[e]xtreme case[],” such as an individual for whom vaccination would cause 
serious harm, the vaccination requirement should be waived.99  Either the 
vaccination law would have to be construed as not intended to reach such 
cases, “or, if it was so intended,” the Court could act to “protect the health 
and life of the individual concerned,” but the Court was: 
not inclined to hold that the statute establishes the absolute rule that an 
adult must be vaccinated if it be apparent or can be shown with 
reasonable certainty that he is not at the time a fit subject of 
vaccination or that vaccination, by reason of his then condition, would 
seriously impair his health or probably cause his death.100 
The Court thus added an important qualification to its apparent paean to the 
police power: it essentially implied, on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds, a limited health exception to the vaccination law.  While the Court 
did not explain in detail the precise burden on a plaintiff seeking such an 
exception, it clearly opened the door to plaintiffs challenging the 
applicability of a vaccination law based on their own medical evidence.101  In 
this way, Jacobson resembles Carhart I more than it appears at first 
glance.102 
 
more to do with the overwhelming social consensus that vaccination was medically valuable than a 
view that the medical bona fides of a health action were irrelevant”). 
98. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36.  It appears that the Court found Jacobson’s proffered evidence on 
this point inapposite because it was possible that he had had an adverse reaction to vaccination as a 
child but was now an adult who was sufficiently healthy to be vaccinated.  Id. at 37. 
99. Id. at 38, 38–39. 
100. Id. at 39. 
101. In the autonomy cases, by contrast, the burden appears to be on the government to show 
that no health exception is necessary—as in Carhart I, discussed above.  Similarly, in Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Supreme Court rejected a school board’s 
attempt to justify a mandatory pregnancy-leave policy based on generalized statements about the 
health risks associated with working while pregnant.  Id. at 648.  The Court thus placed the burden 
on the government to avoid individualized assessment of pregnant women’s health needs.  See id. at 
644. 
102. Cf. Hay, 35 S.E. at 461 (noting that a health exception to a vaccination law was required, 
although not provided for in the statutory language, and remanding a criminal conviction for a 
determination of whether the defendant was entitled to the benefit of that exception).  Professor 
Michael Willrich points to the lawsuits challenging mandatory vaccination as some of the first and 
most important moments in which judges began to recognize claims of individual rights against 
police power in the context of the Progressive era.  Willrich, supra note 86, at 3. 
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The Supreme Court applied Jacobson’s hallmark deference to 
legislatures and emphasis on the police power to protect the public health in 
the decades after Jacobson, while ignoring Jacobson’s suggestion of an 
individual right to protect one’s own health.  In Buck v. Bell, for example, the 
Supreme Court infamously rejected due process and equal protection chal-
lenges to a Virginia law permitting coerced sterilization of the mentally 
incompetent.103  Relying on “the general declarations of the legislature and 
the specific findings of the [lower c]ourt”104—the former included the finding 
“that experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the 
transmission of insanity, imbecility, [etc.]”105—the Supreme Court cited 
Jacobson for the proposition that “[t]he principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”106  The 
principle alluded to, of course, is that individuals’ interests may be subordi-
nated to the government’s power to protect the public health.107  While Buck 
may be regarded as an irregularity in the fabric of constitutional law,108 it fits 
within the paradigm of the public-health line of cases, characterized by its 
deference to legislative findings of medical fact and its blindness to claims of 
individual autonomy in favor of the population view, which sees sick indi-
viduals primarily as threats to the public health.  Of course, Buck was 
decided only fifteen years before Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,109 
which struck down a sterilization law for criminals on equal protection 
grounds and recognized procreation as a fundamental right,110 highlighting 
the schism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence between those cases viewed 
as public-health cases and those viewed as autonomy cases.111 
 
103. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
104. Id. at 207. 
105. Id. at 206. 
106. Id. at 207. 
107. Moreover, “the Court did not view Jacobson as having required any substantive standard 
of necessity or reasonableness that would prevent what today would be considered an indefensible 
assault.”  Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-
Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 584 (2005). 
108. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive 
Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1996) (describing 
Buck as “an anomaly” and noting that “[e]xcept in the context of vaccination for contagious disease, 
coercive court ordered medical procedures had not been endorsed by the Supreme Court prior to 
Buck”); Mariner et al., supra note 107, at 586 (“Today, a general interest in the public’s health or 
welfare could not justify sterilizing Carrie Buck against her will.”). 
109. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
110. Id. at 541. 
111. Skinner did not overrule but instead distinguished Buck.  See id. at 539–42.  But the Court 
was much less deferential toward the legislature’s factual findings regarding the medical 
appropriateness of sterilization for certain classes of individuals in Skinner than in Buck.  Compare 
Skinner, 316 U.S. 535, which struck down a sterilization law for criminals on equal protection 
grounds, with Buck, 274 U.S. 200, which rejected due process and equal protection challenges to a 
Virginia law permitting coerced sterilization of the mentally incompetent.  See also Lombardo, 
supra note 108, at 19, 18–19 (noting how the Court distinguished Buck in its decision in Skinner, in 
part due to the “more precise use of eugenic criteria” in Buck). 
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Likewise, the Supreme Court decided two cases during Prohibition that 
rejected challenges to the Volstead Act’s limited exemptions for medicinal 
use of alcohol: James Everard’s Breweries v. Day,112 a challenge to the 
exclusion of malt liquors from the Act’s allowance of alcohol for medicinal 
purposes, and Lambert v. Yellowley,113 a challenge to the Act’s limitation on 
the amount of alcohol that could be prescribed.  In both cases, the Court 
again rejected substantive-due-process challenges to government intervention 
in medical treatment decisions.  The Court noted that while there was not a 
complete consensus of opinion on the topic, Congress had made a determi-
nation that malt liquor had no medicinal use114 and also had implicitly 
determined that there was no legitimate need for prescriptions above the 
quantities permitted by law.115  Of course, the Court could not rely on the 
power to protect public health in the Prohibition cases because the Volstead 
Act was federal and Congress possessed no general police power.  That did 
not stop the Court from deferring to Congress’s determinations regarding the 
public health, however.116  The Court explained in Lambert that Congress’s 
finding, “in the presence of the well-known diverging opinions of physicians, 
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or without reasonable basis.”117  Moreover, 
although the Prohibition cases, unlike the abortion or medical-marijuana 
cases, were decided in a context in which Congress had reviewed extensive 
quantities of evidence, it had not specifically made findings about the key 
issue in Lambert—namely, the medically appropriate doses of alcohol.118  In 
 
112. 265 U.S. 545 (1924). 
113. 272 U.S. 581 (1926). 
114. Everard’s Breweries, 265 U.S. at 561–62. 
115. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 594–95 (citing Everard’s Breweries, 265 U.S. at 560). 
116. In a masterful recent article, Robert Post has situated Everard’s Breweries and Lambert in 
the context of the debate over the appropriate scope of federal power in the Progressive era.  See 
Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: 
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 57–67 (2006).  Indeed, Post explains 
that the original draft of the Lambert opinion: 
cited Everard’s Breweries, documented extensive state regulation of the prescription of 
alcoholic beverages for medicinal purposes in order to enforce municipal prohibition 
laws, and then concluded with the peremptory announcement [still contained in the 
opinion] that “[t]here is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the 
police power . . . or to the power of Congress to make laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the command of the Eighteenth Amendment.” 
Id. at 60 n.212 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting THE LOUIS DEMBITZ 
BRANDEIS PAPERS, at Reel 29 (1985)). 
117. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 595.  But cf. United States v. Freund, 290 F. 411 (D. Mont. 1923) 
(holding, before Everard’s Breweries and Lambert were decided, that it was unconstitutional for 
Congress to override a physician’s judgment regarding the maximum amount of alcohol to be 
prescribed per day).  The Freund court argued that such restrictions violate the “lawful property and 
personal right of physicians to prescribe alcohol for remedial purposes, and of ailing people to 
receive it,” id. at 413, and that “[i]t is an extravagant and unreasonable attempt to subordinate the 
judgment of the attending physician to that of Congress, in respect to matters with which the former 
alone is competent to deal,”  id. at 414. 
118. See Lambert, 272 U.S. at 598–605 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislature 
had not reviewed evidence on the specific issue before the Court). 
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addition, one “distinguished physician”119 had determined that the statute’s 
prohibitions conflicted with his medical judgment, and the American 
Medical Association had filed an amicus brief arguing that the statute’s 
dosage limitations were contrary to science, arbitrary, and unreasonable.120 
The public-health approach embodied by Buck, the Prohibition cases, 
and, at least in part, Jacobson is manifested in more modern cases 
concerning patients’ access to Laetrile, an unapproved drug claimed by some 
to be an effective treatment for cancer.  In United States v. Rutherford,121 the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that terminally ill cancer patients had no 
right to access Laetrile.122  As in OCBC, the Supreme Court decided the case 
on statutory grounds, construing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
to reach Laetrile and to imply no exemption for terminally ill cancer 
patients.123  Although the plaintiffs had raised constitutional issues as well, 
and although those issues were extensively briefed, the Court did not reach 
them because the court of appeals had not ruled on them.124  Nonetheless, the 
Court’s reasoning fit the public-health model, as it paraded the horribles that 
might occur if Congress’s and the FDA’s police power were not upheld.  The 
Court suggested that creating an exemption for terminal patients would 
ultimately “deny the [FDA] Commissioner’s authority over all drugs, 
however toxic or ineffectual, for such individuals.”125  The Court continued: 
If history is any guide, this new market would not be long overlooked.  
Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs have 
advertised a wide variety of purportedly simple and painless cures for 
cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and 
ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored floodlamps; pastes 
made from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral tablets; and 
“Fountain of Youth” mixtures of spices, oil, and suet.126 
Such fears echo the Court’s historical solicitude for the legislature’s 
ability to freely exercise its police powers to protect the public health. 
In both the Government’s Supreme Court brief and the subsequent 
Tenth Circuit decision on remand rejecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claims of a right to access Laetrile, the public-health rationale was 
predominant.  In its brief, the Government argued that to recognize a 
constitutional right to access “[u]nproven or [i]neffective drugs” would fly in 
the face of the “centuries-old function of government”127 to “protect the 
 
119. Post, supra note 116, at 62 (quoting Lambert, 272 U.S. at 488). 
120. Id. at 61–64, 64 & n.20. 
121. 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
122. Id. at 552. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 559 n.18. 
125. Id. at 557–58. 
126. Id. at 558. 
127. Brief for the United States at 56, Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (No. 78-605). 
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public health and welfare”128 and cited Jacobson for the proposition that the 
Court should defer to Congress’s determination that the FDA was empow-
ered to find that Laetrile was not safe and effective.129  Similarly, when the 
Tenth Circuit considered the constitutional issues on remand, it drew a dis-
tinction between “the decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or 
not,” which according to the court was “a protected right,” and the patient’s 
“selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication,” which was 
“within the area of governmental interest in protecting public health.”130  
Bringing the point home further, the Ninth Circuit held in a similar case 
raising basically identical constitutional issues that “[c]onstitutional rights of 
privacy and personal liberty do not give individuals the right to obtain 
[L]aetrile free of the lawful exercise of government police power”; thus the 
court applied only rational basis review and found that the prohibition on 
access to Laetrile bore a “reasonable relation to the legitimate state purpose 
of protecting public health.”131 
Rutherford was decided against the backdrop of another Supreme Court 
case touching briefly on, and cursorily dismissing, the right to make medical 
treatment choices.  Whalen v. Roe,132 decided only a few years after Roe v. 
Wade, somewhat equivocally embodies the public-health approach.  In 
Whalen, physicians and patients challenged a New York statute requiring that 
physicians notify the state health department whenever they prescribed cer-
tain drugs having a high potential for abuse.133  The plaintiffs argued that the 
statute invaded their right to privacy, meaning both their right to informa-
tional privacy and their right to make certain important decisions 
independently—namely, “decisions about matters vital to the care of their 
health.”134  While Whalen notably appeared to recognize, albeit in passing, 
the individual “right to decide independently, with the advice of [a] 
physician, to acquire and use needed medication,” it rejected the plaintiffs’ 
medical privacy claim on a police-power, public-health rationale.135  Relying 
on the state’s “broad police powers in regulating the administration of drugs 
by the health professions,” the Court stated in dicta that “the State no doubt 
 
128. Id. at 57. 
129. Id. at 70–71.  The Commissioner initially made no such finding; the Government argued at 
the beginning of the Rutherford litigation that Laetrile was a “new drug” under the FDCA that was 
not found to be safe and effective, although the FDA initially had produced no record to support that 
finding.  Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1143 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 442 U.S. 544.  
After the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, the FDA held 
hearings and ultimately determined, again, that Laetrile was a new drug that had not been proven 
safe and effective.  Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 549. 
130. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980). 
131. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980). 
132. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
133. Id. at 592–93, 595. 
134. Id. at 600, 599–600. 
135. Id. at 603. 
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could prohibit entirely the use of particular Schedule II drugs.”136  Yet 
Whalen remains a somewhat ambiguous precedent on this point: while af-
firming the state’s public-health powers to regulate access to drugs, the Court 
also noted that the state had not, in fact, limited the decision to prescribe or 
use those drugs; the case was therefore not a particularly strong one for the 
asserted constitutional right, and the Court’s statements about outlawing 
certain drugs were pure dicta.137 
What characterizes the public-health line of cases, as distinct from the 
autonomy cases, is not so much that every individual asserting a right to 
access or avoid a certain medical treatment has lost, but rather that the courts 
have consistently declined to apply any form of heightened scrutiny to 
individual claims of a right to make medical treatment decisions without 
governmental interference.  The public-health line of cases emphasizes the 
police power of the legislature, treating its power and duty to protect the 
public health as fundamental.138  Individuals seeking access to medical treat-
ment (or seeking to avoid medical treatment, as in Jacobson and Buck) are 
seen not as autonomous beings seeking to protect their own bodies and to 
make important decisions without government interference, but as potential 
threats to the health of the body politic.  The language of protecting the pub-
lic health, moreover, is dominant even in those cases, such as the Prohibition 
cases and the Laetrile cases, in which an act of Congress is involved, and 
therefore no general police power, in a strict sense, may be invoked.  Of 
course, as discussed further in Part IV, there is no doubt that the concerns 
emphasized in the public-health cases, such as the necessity of protecting the 
public from quacks, snake-oil salesmen, and unsafe and untested drugs, are 
legitimate.  But courts applying the public-health approach have simply 
privileged such concerns over individual autonomy rights, rather than bal-
ancing them. 
B. The Autonomy Cases 
The right to bodily integrity is one of the oldest fundamental rights 
recognized by the law.139  Although it is arguably protected by the Fourth 
 
136. Id. at 603 & n.30. 
137. Specifically, the Court stated, “Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of 
the right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician, to acquire and to use needed 
medication.”  Id. at 603.  It is thus unclear whether the Court recognized such a right but found that 
it had not been burdened in the instant case, or whether the Court remained agnostic as to the 
existence of such a right. 
138. Cf. Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (“There can be no 
question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its police power to regulate . . . dangerous 
and habit-forming drugs . . . .  The right to exercise this power is so manifest in the interest of the 
public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it 
is too firmly established to be successfully called in question.”). 
139. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125, *130) 
(“A right of control over one’s body has deep roots in the common law.”), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 
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Amendment,140 Eighth Amendment,141 and even the common law,142 the no-
tion of bodily integrity is perhaps most commonly associated with the 
Fourteenth Amendment143 and substantive due process, under which it is 
closely tied to the concept of personal autonomy.  The origins of the right to 
bodily integrity may be traced to Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,144 in 
which the Court held that a plaintiff in a personal injury suit could not be 
ordered “to submit to a surgical examination as to the extent of the injury 
sued for.”145  Holding the judge to be without authority under the common 
law to require such an invasion, the Court famously stated, “No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law.”146  Indeed, the Court even suggested this right “to be let 
alone” was not just a liberty interest to be balanced against governmental 
interests but a “complete immunity.”147  Moreover, the Court’s language 
from that early case indicates that the right not to suffer physical invasion or 
harm at the hands of the state is tied to the right of autonomy over one’s 
person—the “right . . . to possession and control” of one’s person and the 
right “to be let alone.”148 
It is largely the bodily integrity right, combined with the right to make 
certain intimate and important decisions autonomously, that is front and 
center in the autonomy line of cases.  Yet the autonomy cases, epitomized by 
the Supreme Court’s reproductive-rights jurisprudence, originally viewed the 
right at stake as having as much to do with protecting one’s health and mak-
ing medical treatment choices in consultation with a physician as with more 
abstract autonomy rights, such as deciding whether to bear a child.  In their 
 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 816–18 (S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(outlining U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to be free from unwanted bodily 
intrusions dating back to 1884). 
140. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (holding that a 
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence would violate that individual’s 
“right to be secure in his person” and be “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment). 
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (characterizing 
the Eighth Amendment as “specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain in penal institutions” and as “the primary source of substantive protection to convicted 
prisoners” in cases involving excessive force). 
142. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that the common 
law carefully guards the right of every individual “to the possession and control of his own 
person”). 
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) 
(noting that the Court has held “the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] includes the right[] . . . to bodily integrity”). 
144. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
145. Id. at 251. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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present incarnation, the autonomy cases have come to stand for constitutional 
protection of certain dignity and equality interests,149 but they retain traces of 
their commitment to individual medical autonomy as well. 
Griswold is the first autonomy case dealing with a right to make 
medical treatment choices.150  Although the case is known for its holding 
regarding the right to privacy, especially within the marital relationship, the 
case also involved what was clearly recognized to be a medical intervention, 
in which the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut and its medical director, a physician, “gave information, 
instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of pre-
venting conception.  They examined the wife and prescribed the best 
 
149. Thus, the autonomy cases ultimately gave rise to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
which intertwines dignity and equality concerns.  See id. at 575 (“Equality of treatment and the due 
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are 
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”).  See 
generally Tribe, supra note 74, at 1902–07 (discussing Lawrence’s synthesis of substantive-due-
process and equal protection concerns). 
150. One might view Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) as the true 
progenitor of Griswold and the other privacy cases, but Skinner, like the line of prisoner bodily 
integrity cases, including Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (upholding forced 
antipsychotic treatment of a prisoner who was dangerous to himself and others, where medically 
appropriate); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (rejecting mandatory antipsychotic treatment 
of the defendant during trial where necessary findings were not made); and Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to defendants 
awaiting trial was permissible if the defendant was dangerous and treatment was medically 
appropriate), is not discussed here because, while relevant, it involves government-imposed harm 
and bodily invasion, which is quite different from a governmental attempt to prohibit access to a 
medication or treatment sought by an individual.  Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) 
(holding that forced stomach pumping of an arrested person to obtain evidence of illegal drug 
possession violated the Due Process Clause); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that the ability to pursue a wrongful-death claim based on radiation 
experiments conducted on cancer patients without their consent is a property interest protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  See generally Gelman, supra note 85 
(discussing the “biological alteration” cases).  In addition, Harper, Riggins, and Sell were decided 
under the less strict standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), for evaluating infringements 
on the liberty of prisoners.  See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179–82 (applying the standard previously applied 
in Harper, 494 U.S. at 223–25, and Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134–35); Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134–35 
(applying the standard previously applied in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223–25); Harper, 
494 U.S. at 223–25 (applying the standard from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89).  Nonetheless, the 
lack of deference to the legislature’s findings of medical fact in Skinner, for example, is noteworthy.  
See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 542 (“We have not the slightest basis for inferring that [the line drawn by 
the statute allowing sterilization of criminals convicted of larceny but not embezzlement] has any 
significance in eugenics, nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal 
distinctions which the law has marked between those two offenses.”).  This lack of deference may 
be contrasted with the Court’s deferential stance in Buck v. Bell.  See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 
205, 207 (1927) (showing deference to the legislature’s findings that a “feeble minded” woman 
should be sterilized).  See generally Lombardo, supra note 108 (discussing Skinner and Buck and 
tracing the origins of the reproductive-rights cases to those cases, as well as Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967)).  Finally, it is interesting to note that even in the prisoner line of cases, the forced 
medication must be “medically appropriate” in order to be constitutional, suggesting that a prisoner 
might have a right to refuse antipsychotic treatment that would harm his health.  See, e.g., Harper, 
494 U.S. at 222–23, 222 & n.8 (discussing the requirement of medical appropriateness). 
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contraceptive device or material for her use.”151  Moreover, the Court noted 
early in the Griswold opinion that the Connecticut contraceptives law 
“operate[d] directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their 
physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”152 
Perhaps more importantly, contraceptives were sometimes prescribed 
for health reasons, and although health concerns receive only passing 
mention in one of the concurrences in Griswold, the toll on some women’s 
health caused by pregnancy was one of the driving concerns behind the birth-
control movement.153  As Mary Dudziak recounts in her essay on birth con-
trol in Connecticut before Griswold, in the presence of a strict prohibition 
like Connecticut’s, some women were forced to choose between forgoing 
marital sex and suffering potentially life-threatening conditions during 
pregnancy.154  The lack of a medical exception outraged Dr. Lee Buxton, one 
of the challengers of the statute in Griswold, who had witnessed the serious 
harms and even deaths that women suffered as a result of the law.155  The 
lack of a medical exception was also the subject of extensive litigation over 
Connecticut’s birth-control statute before Griswold.156  Griswold thus con-
cerned the right to protect one’s health through medical treatment choices 
made autonomously and without government interference—not only in the 
sense that it centered on the right of married persons to use some drugs or 
devices available primarily by prescription but also in the sense that the right 
of some women to protect their health by avoiding pregnancy was at stake in 
a very real way. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,157 the themes of individual bodily privacy and 
autonomy appeared more prominent, although the briefs and concurring 
opinions in that case evidence the continuing importance of more medical 
concerns.  In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court struck down Massachusetts’s 
statutory scheme regulating contraceptives, which provided that only married 
persons could obtain contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy 
and only from registered physicians or pharmacists.158  Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion famously emphasized “the right of the individual, married 
 
151. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (emphasis omitted). 
152. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). 
153. See id. at 503 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the statute “forbids all married persons 
the right to use birth-control devices, regardless of whether their use is dictated by considerations of 
family planning, health, or indeed even of life itself” (citation omitted)); Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say 
No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. 
REV. 915, 921–27 (1990) (describing the impact that health concerns had on the development of 
Connecticut state law governing the use of birth control). 
154. Dudziak, supra note 153, at 918. 
155. Id. at 932. 
156. Id. at 932–35. 
157. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
158. Id. at 442.  Under the Massachusetts law, anyone—married or single—could obtain 
contraceptives from anyone—not just from doctors or pharmacists—for the purpose of preventing 
the spread of disease.  Id. 
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or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child,”159 setting the stage for subsequent vindication of the right to abortion 
as an aspect of the right to privacy.160 
Yet, significantly, Eisenstadt was argued by the state of Massachusetts 
as if it concerned only the public-health power of the state to limit the 
distribution of contraceptives to physicians.161  Both Justice White, in his 
concurrence, and Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, focused on this aspect of 
the case.162  Chief Justice Burger, in fact, felt that the entire case should be 
decided based on the state’s police power to regulate the distribution of 
medical drugs and devices for the protection of public health: “So far as I am 
aware,” he urged, “this Court has never before challenged the police power 
of a State to protect the public from the risks of possibly spurious and delete-
rious substances sold within its borders.”163  The majority, however, briskly 
dismissed the view that the Massachusetts law was a health measure,164 
sidestepping altogether the question whether distribution of contraceptives 
could be limited to physicians and instead focusing on the unequal treatment 
of married and unmarried persons.165 
Justice White also viewed the law as a public-health measure; he merely 
disagreed with Chief Justice Burger as to the scrutiny to which the health 
measure should be subjected and the amount of evidence the government was 
required to present in order to show the reasonableness of its restriction.  
Justice White argued that the Court’s “general reluctance to question a 
State’s judgment on matters of public health must give way where, as here, 
the restriction at issue burdens the constitutional rights of married persons to 
use contraceptives.”166  Therefore, he argued that the state should have to 
present “proof of the probable hazards” of using those items widely available 
elsewhere without a prescription.167  Chief Justice Burger found that 
 
159. Id. at 453. 
160. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (discussing the role 
of similar reasoning in Brennan’s Griswold opinion in conceptualizing the privacy and birth-control 
cases that followed it). 
161. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING 
OF ROE V. WADE 518–19 (1994). 
162. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460–65 (White, J., concurring); id. at 465–72 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
163. Id. at 469 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
164. Id. at 452 (majority opinion) (“We conclude, accordingly, that, despite the statute’s 
superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably 
be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations.”).  David Garrow notes 
that the strategy of the ACLU, which filed an amicus brief on behalf of Baird, was to keep the focus 
on the privacy issue.  GARROW, supra note 161, at 517–18. 
165. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447, 446–56 (discussing how, under the Equal Protection 
Clause analysis, no ground of difference “rationally explains the different treatment accorded 
married and unmarried persons” by Massachusetts law). 
166. Id. at 463–64 (White, J., concurring). 
167. Id. at 464. 
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suggestion outrageous, complaining that it put the state “to an unprecedented 
test: either the record must contain evidence supporting the classification or 
the health hazards of the particular contraceptive must be judicially 
noticeable.”168  In his view, whether medical authorities agreed or disagreed 
about the safety of a particular contraceptive, it was “inappropriate for th[e] 
Court to overrule a legislative classification.”169  The disagreement between 
Justice White and Chief Justice Burger in Eisenstadt thus foreshadows the 
later dispute in Carhart I between the majority, which required the state to 
produce some medical evidence to support its findings, and the dissents, 
which insisted on the state’s power to make factual judgments—like the ma-
jority in OCBC, which relied unquestioningly on the legislative classification 
of cannabis.170 
Roe v. Wade and its companion case Doe v. Bolton,171 as they evolved 
from the Griswold and Eisenstadt precedents, were ultimately decided 
primarily on a privacy rationale, although traces remained of concerns about 
the woman’s entitlement to protect her health and to make medical treatment 
choices independent of state interference and with a doctor’s advice.172  This 
latter perspective emerges most clearly in Justice Douglas’s concurrence; he 
viewed the decision as being at least partly about the constitutional right “to 
care for one’s health and person,”173 or the “right to seek advice on one’s 
 
168. Id. at 469 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
169. Id. at 470. 
170. See supra notes 42, 59–63 and accompanying text.  In addition, the end of Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion prophetically raises the specter of the Laetrile cases of the 1970s and 1980s.  
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 472.  The Chief Justice noted: 
I am constrained to suggest that if the Constitution can be strained to invalidate the 
Massachusetts statute underlying appellee’s conviction, we could quite as well employ 
it for the protection of a “curbstone quack,” reminiscent of the “medicine man” of 
times past, who attracted a crowd of the curious with a soapbox lecture and then plied 
them with “free samples” of some unproved remedy.  Massachusetts presumably 
outlawed such activities long ago, but today’s holding seems to invite their return. 
Id. 
171. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
172. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (cataloguing the physical and 
psychological harms that may result from carrying a pregnancy to term); id. at 164 (holding that in 
the first trimester, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of 
the pregnant woman’s attending physician”); Doe, 410 U.S. at 197 (mentioning the “woman’s right 
to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician’s best judgment and the 
physician’s right to administer it”); see also, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF 
ABSOLUTES 13 (1990) (noting that Justice Blackmun had served as counsel to the Mayo Clinic prior 
to his appointment to the Supreme Court and suggesting that he may have been influenced by his 
medical background to focus the opinion on physicians rather than women’s equality); cf. Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992) 
(contrasting Roe’s emphasis on the physician’s judgment with Casey’s emphasis on sex equality).  
A recent, thoughtful article calls the commonly held view that Justice Blackmun was influenced by 
his health-law background into question, however.  Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, 
and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 170 (2006) (“Yet it is apparent 
from his papers that Justice Blackmun brought no conscious agenda to this issue; indeed, he seems 
to have given it very little thought prior to joining the Court.”). 
173. Doe, 410 U.S. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
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health and the right to place reliance on the physician of one’s choice;”174 he 
viewed the abortion issue as “a medical one.”175  And indeed, that was pre-
cisely the theory with which the plaintiffs began the substantive portion of 
their briefs—citing, and distinguishing, Jacobson v. Massachusetts first and 
foremost.176 
The fact that the right to make medical treatment choices, while not 
dominant in the majority opinion, nonetheless still lurked in Roe and Doe 
may explain as well why the court instituted, without much commentary, the 
health-exception requirement.  In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that after 
viability, the State may regulate or proscribe abortion altogether, “except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”177  Roe did 
not explain that holding, beyond saying that the state’s interest in the fetus 
becomes compelling at the point of viability; Thornburgh later elaborated 
that the State may not constitutionally force a woman to sacrifice her health 
for that of the fetus, whether viable or not.178  Neither Roe nor Thornburgh—
nor, for that matter, Casey, which reaffirmed this aspect of Roe’s holding 
wholesale, while modifying many other aspects of abortion jurisprudence—
explicitly stated that the right to protect one’s health is a constitutionally 
protected right.  But the existence of such a constitutional right—and one that 
is in fact sufficiently robust to withstand the state’s otherwise compelling 
interest in the viable fetus—is the inescapable implication of Roe and its 
progeny, up to and including Carhart I and II. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
decisional autonomy rationale seemed paramount.179  As the joint opinion 
explained in that case: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education. . . .  At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not 
 
174. Id. at 219. 
175. Id. at 215. 
176. See Brief for Appellants at *94, *94–98, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128054 
(arguing that “The Right to Seek and Receive Medical Care for the Protection of Health and Well-
Being Is a Fundamental Personal Liberty Recognised by Decisions of This Court” and that 
Jacobson permitted interference with that right only in the face of a compelling state interest); see 
also Hunter, supra note 172, at 171–72 (“The substantive argument in the appellants’ brief began 
with an assertion of a right to seek and receive medical care . . . .”). 
177. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, 163–64. 
178. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986) 
(observing that the Court had previously “recognized the undesirability of any ‘trade-off’ between 
the woman’s health and additional percentage points of fetal survival” and that the State did “not 
take any real issue with this proposition”). 
179. See David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”?  Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, 
and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 313–14 (2000) (noting that Casey properly 
explicated the constitutional foundation of the reproductive rights cases in terms of a right to 
autonomy in making certain important personal decisions). 
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define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.180 
The joint opinion further noted that the abortion right draws upon both 
the right to personal autonomy and the right of bodily integrity embodied in 
the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions . . . . 
 Roe . . . may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold 
liberty but as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on 
governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its 
rejection.181 
By the time the Court decided Casey, the right at issue had thus taken on the 
distinct cast of an autonomy right.  It invoked the right of autonomy over 
one’s own body as well as autonomy in making certain important decisions. 
This autonomy rationale remained dominant in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, in which the Court appeared to recognize at least a limited right 
to make medical treatment decisions.182  In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court 
refused to recognize a fundamental “right to commit suicide which itself in-
cludes a right to assistance in doing so.”183  In other words, the Supreme 
Court, which had previously suggested the existence of a right of competent 
persons to refuse even life-saving medical treatment,184 declined to extend 
the scope of that right to choosing medical treatment in the form of obtaining 
a prescription from one’s physician for a drug that will hasten death.185  Yet, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion on that point was tempered 
somewhat by the other opinions in the case—especially Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, which provided the necessary fifth vote for Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion.  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence equivocally 
stated that while she agreed that the Constitution did not protect a right to 
suicide and therefore to assistance in committing suicide, she did not need to 
reach the “narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is 
experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in 
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death” because the 
 
180. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
181. Id. at 857. 
182. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–26 (1997). 
183. Id. at 723. 
184. See id. at 725; Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A 
Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 971, 
986 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court “has been less than crystal clear” in its pronouncements 
on the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment but that the Court most likely would accept the 
existence of such a fundamental right). 
185. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–22 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 
(1990)); id. at 753 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that plaintiffs sought to obtain “medications . . . 
to be self-administered for the purpose of hastening . . . death” (omissions in original) (quoting 
Complaint ¶ 2.3, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (No. 
C94-119R))). 
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State’s interests were sufficiently strong in the instant case to overcome any 
such right.186  In addition, several commentators have pointed out that five 
Justices in Glucksberg suggested that they would recognize a right to obtain 
medication from one’s physician in a quantity sufficient to alleviate physical 
suffering, even if it would hasten the patient’s death.187 
Glucksberg therefore constitutes somewhat uncertain precedent, but at a 
minimum it may be said that it appears to recognize both a fundamental right 
to choose to refuse certain medical treatment and a right to receive certain 
medical treatment in consultation with one’s physician—namely, aggressive 
palliative care.  Those rights are clearly viewed by the Justices in Glucksberg 
as autonomy rights deriving from the line of cases reaching back at least to 
Griswold, as is evident from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s framing of the issue in 
Cruzan188 and Glucksberg.  In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted 
that the issue was whether the right to physician-assisted suicide was within 
the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.189 
The autonomy line of cases thus begins with the right to protect one’s 
health by making autonomous medical treatment decisions.  By the time of 
Casey and Glucksberg, the interest in making medical treatment choices 
merged with other autonomy interests into a vaguer and broader autonomy 
right of bodily integrity and decisional independence.  All of the autonomy 
cases grant some form of heightened scrutiny to claims of infringement on 
the right to choose appropriate medical treatment, whether it be in the form 
of a virtual per se rule that government may not interfere with a woman’s 
right to protect her health by choosing abortion, as in Roe, or in the form of 
some sort of careful balancing of interests, which the Court in Glucksberg 
 
186. Id. at 736, 736–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
187. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895, 908 (1998) (noting evidence that five members of the Court would 
likely recognize a right to obtain death-inducing medication in order to alleviate suffering).  This 
view is based on the fact that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, noted that the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg case had access under state law to 
obtain sufficient palliative care and that the Court therefore did not need to decide whether patients 
had a right to be relieved from suffering by receiving sufficient palliative care, even if that palliation 
might hasten death.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justices Stevens, 
Breyer, and Souter, concurring separately, offered similar or even more expansive views of that 
purported constitutional right.  See id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 779–82 (Souter, J., 
concurring); id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).  But see Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, 
Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1835 (2004) (“The 
legal status of terminal sedation is still unclear.” (citing Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, 
The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 142–50 (2000))). 
188. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
189. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.  Acknowledging that Cruzan had viewed the right to refuse 
unwanted life-saving treatment as just such a “liberty interest,” id., Chief Justice Rehnquist then 
noted that while the right to end one’s life may be “just as personal and profound as the decision to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment,” id. at 725, it is not similarly protected; although “many of the 
rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy,” that did not 
mean “that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”  Id. at 727. 
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suggested would be required for any law interfering with a seriously ill 
patient’s access to palliative care.  Carhart I, with its broad recognition of a 
woman’s right to choose the safest method of abortion, grows directly out of 
this line of cases. 
C. A Right to Make Medical Treatment Choices? 
Although the cases just discussed may be divided into two relatively 
neat categories, one of my principal contentions is that they all deal with 
essentially the same problem—the constitutional right of individuals to make 
medical treatment choices—and that the categories are not helpful to 
understanding or operationalizing this right.  In other words, the different 
approaches are not doctrinally justified because the cases all pose funda-
mentally the same question.  There are, of course, additional interests that 
may weigh in favor of one party or another in various cases—for instance, 
some cases also invoke the right to reproductive autonomy, whereas other 
cases involve a governmental interest in protecting against an untested and 
potentially harmful medical treatment—but this does not make the cases so 
different that they cannot all be analyzed in similar terms. 
In this subpart, I demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two 
kinds of cases by exploring how lower courts have dealt with analogous 
cases.  Lower courts have evinced tremendous confusion in analyzing cases 
touching on the right to make medical treatment choices, sometimes em-
bracing an autonomy approach, sometimes following a public-health 
approach, and sometimes, like some of the Supreme Court cases discussed 
above, embodying both approaches among the majority and dissenting opin-
ions within a single case.  This fluidity, combined with the occasional 
overlap of public-health and autonomy concerns within the Supreme Court 
cases themselves, demonstrates that either analytic approach is plausible, 
given the existing precedent, and that there is no clear line demarcating 
public-health cases from autonomy cases.  In the next Part, I consider and 
reject some possible doctrinal explanations for the differing approaches and 
results in the two lines of cases. 
Some lower courts, faced squarely with the issue, have inferred a right 
to make medical treatment choices in the face of government attempts to 
forbid certain alternatives.  In Andrews v. Ballard,190 the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas struck down a state regulation forbidding 
the practice of acupuncture by nonphysicians.191  Relying on the right to pri-
vacy established by Griswold, Roe, and their progeny, the court in Andrews 
held that the “decision to obtain or reject medical treatment, presented in the 
instant case as the decision to obtain acupuncture treatment,” was a 
fundamental right and that infringements of that right were subject to strict 
 
190. 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
191. Id. at 1057. 
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scrutiny.192  Moreover, the court rejected the legislature’s finding that acu-
puncture was “experimental” and that its safety and effectiveness had not 
been established, looking instead to the plaintiffs’ evidence of the safety and 
efficacy of the treatments.193  Because the case was decided before Casey and 
Carhart and while the Laetrile cases were still being litigated, it did not rely 
on those cases.  Instead, the court found that the right to choose a particular 
medical treatment was both sufficiently personal and important to warrant 
constitutional protection under Carey v. Population Services International.194 
More recently, the D.C. Circuit surprised many commentators when it 
initially decided (before reversing itself en banc) that terminally ill patients 
had a substantive-due-process right to access experimental cancer drugs that 
had passed an initial phase of FDA review but were not yet approved by the 
agency.195  In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
von Eschenbach, the court held that Cruzan and Glucksberg led to the infer-
ence that terminally ill patients had a fundamental constitutional right, when 
“acting on a doctor’s advice, to obtain potentially life-saving medication 
when no alternative treatment approved by the government” was available.196  
The majority opinion relied in part on the importance and long persistence of 
the right to bodily integrity to decide that the Due Process Clause protected a 
right of self-preservation by prohibiting interference by the government with 
individuals’ access to potentially life-saving drugs.197 
The dissent took the majority to task not only for recognizing an 
apparently new constitutional right but also for invading the “historical 
province of the democratic branches” by “[b]alancing the risks and benefits 
found at the forefront of uncertain science and medicine.”198  Thus, the 
 
192. Id. at 1048. 
193. Id. at 1041, 1044. 
194. Id. at 1046–51 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).  The 
Andrews court also recognized, however, that it would be permissible for the state to regulate the 
practice of acupuncture, including by requiring diagnosis or referral by a licensed physician.  Id. at 
1056.  The court thus did not recognize an unqualified right of patients to receive the treatment of 
their choice.  See also Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 647 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(asserting that individuals have “no constitutional right to their choice of a health care provider [i.e., 
a midwife] who does not meet quality control standards that a legislator might reasonably conceive 
to be desirable”); Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting patients’ claim 
of a constitutional right to receive acupuncture treatment from a nonphysician). 
195. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see Jerome Groopman, 
The Right to a Trial, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 40, 42 (noting that the opinion “shocked legal 
scholars and officials at the F.D.A.”). 
196. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 478. 
197. Id. at 479–86.  The court distinguished the medical-marijuana cases on the ground that the 
Supreme Court had never decided the substantive-due-process issues raised in OCBC and Raich, id. 
at 478 n.9, and it distinguished the Laetrile cases on the ground that those cases involved the 
“governmental interest in protecting public health” and that no evidence showed Laetrile to be safe, 
as the cancer drugs here were initially determined to be, see id. at 486 (quoting Rutherford v. United 
States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980)). 
198. Id. at 487, 486–87 (Griffith, J., dissenting). 
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dissent complained, “[n]either the Constitution nor Congress has authorized 
this Court to determine which of these two litigants has a more scientifically 
and medically sound view.”199  The dissent suggested, moreover, that the 
majority opinion would open the door to access to medical marijuana, among 
other unapproved treatments.200 
In a subsequent en banc ruling, the D.C. Circuit reversed course, 
deciding that the fundamental right recognized by the initial panel did not in 
fact exist.201  The court emphasized that the drugs at issue had not yet been 
proven either safe or effective,202 which might explain its enigmatic 
statement, “We do not address the broader question of whether access to 
medicine might ever implicate fundamental rights.”203  By focusing on the 
lack of safety and efficacy of the drugs, the court implicitly deferred to the 
FDA’s view without giving any detailed consideration to the question of 
whether that view is necessarily entitled to deference—or in other words, 
how much proof of medical safety and efficacy is required, and who has the 
burden of proving it.204  Indeed, the court cited OCBC, Rutherford, and the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Raich to show that there is no 
“affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably 
prohibited by the Government.”205  The two dissenters, who were the two 
judges constituting the majority in the initial panel decision, predictably 
complained that the court should have “weigh[ed]” the interests of the gov-
ernment and the plaintiffs, and required “proof of the proposed government 
concerns, rather than merely accepting, under the rubric of rational basis 
scrutiny, any assertions the FDA chooses to offer.”206 
Indeed, perhaps the most substantial line of lower court precedent has 
rejected any intimation of a constitutional right to choose appropriate 
medical treatment.  The District Court for the District of Columbia has held, 
relying on the Laetrile cases, that an individual suffering from Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma had no right to treatment with Antineoplastons, an experimental 
drug treatment available only through FDA-approved clinical trials.207  
Similarly, in Kuromiya v. United States,208 decided shortly before OCBC, the 
 
199. Id. at 491. 
200. Id. at 499. 
201. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
202. Id. at 703. 
203. Id. at 701. 
204. See, e.g., id. at 709 (finding no “constitutional right to override the collective judgment of 
the scientific and medical communities expressed through the FDA’s clinical testing process”). 
205. Id. at 710 & n.18. 
206. Id. at 714–15 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
207. Smith v. Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Kulsar v. Ambach, 598 F. 
Supp. 1124, 1125–26 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (relying on Rutherford and Carnohan to reject plaintiffs’ 
claim of constitutional right to access a hypoglycemia drug that the FDA had pulled from the 
market). 
208. 37 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the 
substantive-due-process claims of individuals seeking to use marijuana for 
medicinal purposes for a variety of illnesses.209  Citing a number of public-
health cases holding that no constitutional right was implicated by state 
health regulations, the court in Kuromiya determined that rational basis re-
view would apply to the plaintiffs’ claims, stating that “there is no 
fundamental right of privacy to select one’s medical treatment without regard 
to criminal laws.”210  The court further found that the “ongoing dispute 
regarding the safety and usefulness of marijuana” meant, in the context of 
rationality review, that the prohibitions of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act must be upheld; the existence of conflicting evidence was sufficient to 
require the court to uphold the prohibition—whereas in Carhart I it was suf-
ficient to require the Court to strike it down—and to do so without even 
permitting the plaintiffs to introduce expert evidence of their own.211 
In another case, a court rejected, over a strong dissent, the plaintiffs’ 
claim of a right to access a particular medical treatment, and the majority and 
dissenting opinions can be read as embodying, respectively, the public-health 
and autonomy approaches to the issue.  Thus, the majority in Seeley v. 
State212 embraced the public-health approach in holding that rational basis 
review would apply to a terminally ill cancer patient’s claim of a fundamen-
tal right to use marijuana, noting that complex medical issues were involved 
and that in light of the apparent disagreement over the effectiveness of 
marijuana, it would decline—despite copious expert evidence presented by 
both sides—to “interfere with the broad judicially recognized prerogative of 
the legislature.”213  In addition, the court asserted, “the determination of 
whether new evidence regarding marijuana’s potential medical use should 
result in the reclassification of marijuana is a matter for legislative or 
administrative, not judicial, judgment.”214  The dissent, by contrast, viewed 
the case as one in the line of autonomy cases, such as Roe and Casey.215  The 
dissent focused on the body of the individual, not the body politic, noting for 
example that “[t]here is little relation between the ingestion of marijuana by 
Mr. Seeley and the specter of drug abuse by others.”216  The dissent thus 
believed that the majority should focus on the sufferings and the bodily 
 
209. Id. at 725–27. 
210. Id. at 726, 726–27. 
211. Id. at 727.  The court also stated that it did “not wish to minimize the suffering that the 
plaintiffs have experienced or the degree to which the threat of criminal sanctions may have 
exacerbated their conditions,” but that “[w]here reasonable people may differ, the court is bound to 
defer to the will of the legislature.”  Id. at 731. 
212. 940 P.2d 604 (Wash. 1997) (en banc). 
213. Id. at 618. 
214. Id. at 618–19. 
215. Id. at 626 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (“I find the analysis in Casey as well as its antecedent, 
Roe v. Wade, wholly dispositive in Mr. Seeley’s favor.” (citation omitted)). 
216. Id. at 627. 
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integrity of the individual, instead of the alleged consequences to society of 
legalizing marijuana in some circumstances.217 
A similar pattern is apparent in People v. Privitera,218 in which the 
California Supreme Court, writing prior to the Supreme Court and 
subsequent Tenth Circuit decisions in Rutherford, rejected the notion of a 
constitutional right to access Laetrile.219  Emphasizing the state’s police pow-
ers and legislative findings that Laetrile was ineffective and harmful, the 
court held that it would not “take[] sides” in the medical debate, allowing 
that “Laetrile advocates may yet be vindicated in the court of scientific 
opinion,”220 but that its only task was to determine whether there was a ra-
tional basis for the legislation aimed at protecting the “health and safety” of 
California citizens.221  The impassioned dissent by then-Chief Justice Bird, 
by contrast, considered the existence of conflicting scientific evidence to 
weigh in the opposite direction: “So long as there is no clear evidence that 
[L]aetrile is unsafe to the user,” she stated, “I believe each individual patient 
has a right to obtain the substance from a licensed physician who feels it ap-
propriate to prescribe it to him.”222  The dissent drew upon Griswold, Roe, 
and Doe, among others, to argue that the Supreme Court has recognized an 
individual right to receive medical treatment, along with the physician’s cen-
tral role in the exercise of that right.223  Chief Justice Bird also emphasized 
the suffering of the individual patients over the needs of the broader polity: 
“To these nineteen cancer victims, the enforcement of [the California law], 
the denial to them of medical treatment . . . must surely take on a 
Kafkaesque, a nightmare, quality.  No demonstrated public danger, no com-
pelling interest of the state, warrants an Orwellian intrusion into the most 
private of zones of privacy.”224 
The same conflict between the public-health and autonomy approaches 
is thus played out again and again, sometimes between cases that reach 
conflicting results on the same issue, and sometimes between the majority 
and dissent in a single case.  In the public-health approach, judges focus on 
the citizenry at large, the legislature’s role in protecting the health and safety 
of the public as a whole, and the deference due to the legislature in carrying 
out that task.  In the autonomy approach, judges focus on the suffering 
individual and the state-mandated harm to the individual’s body, often 
 
217. See id. at 624 (criticizing the State’s taking a “larger focus” on the citizenry at large, which 
must be protected from drug abuse and the unknown effects of marijuana). 
218. 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979). 
219. Id. at 926. 
220. Id. at 925. 
221. Id. at 926, 924–26. 
222. Id. at 927 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
223. Id. at 923–36. 
224. Id. at 946. 
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refusing to defer to legislative findings of medical fact in the face of ailing 
individuals’ evidence to the contrary.225 
Perhaps one of the most eloquent articulations of this conflict is 
contained in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, the “right-to-die” case.  Taking the autonomy 
approach, Justice Stevens bemoaned the fact that the Court “permit[ted] the 
State’s abstract, undifferentiated interest in the preservation of life to over-
whelm the best interests of Nancy Beth Cruzan.”226  But, he insisted, “the 
idea of life is not conceived separately from the idea of a living person.  Yet, 
it is by precisely such a separation that Missouri asserts an interest in Nancy 
Cruzan’s life in opposition to Nancy Cruzan’s own interests.”227  In other 
words, Justice Stevens criticized the Court’s and the State’s emphasis on the 
“big picture,” the government’s power and duty to protect public health and 
life in a broad, general, and abstract sense, which comes at a profound cost to 
the individual’s interests in her own health or life.228  This is precisely the 
drama that is repeated throughout the cases that alternatingly take the auton-
omy and public-health approaches to the right to make medical treatment 
choices. 
D. An Awkward Convergence: Gonzales v. Carhart 
Last Term, in Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), the Supreme Court had 
the opportunity to reconsider the necessity of a health exception in D&X 
bans, as well as to reconcile the conflicting approaches represented by 
Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I) and OCBC.  While it did the former with 
gusto, it only gestured toward the latter.  The case clearly exhibited the ten-
sion between the two existing approaches but did not resolve it, opting 
instead to take a modest, procedurally oriented tack and to avoid direct con-
frontation with the issue of how the right to make medical treatment choices 
should be analyzed. 
Carhart II involved a constitutional challenge to the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA) of 2003, which outlaws D&X abortions 
“in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,” using terminology that is 
more precisely descriptive of the D&X procedure than that considered in 
 
225. On occasion, as in Rutherford and Carnohan, courts distinguish between an established 
constitutional right to receive treatment and a nonexistent constitutional right to a particular 
treatment.  Yet it is difficult to perceive such a distinction in the case law—the abortion cases, for 
example, draw no such distinction—and it is difficult to see how such a distinction can be clearly 
made in reality.  If the only treatment legally available is ineffective for the particular individual, for 
instance, can it truly be said that the individual’s right to medical treatment has been vindicated? 
226. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 331 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
227. Id. at 347. 
228. Michael Allen refers to this distinction as the (state’s) “comprehensive interest” in human 
life, Allen, supra note 184, at 990, as opposed to the individual’s “focused interest,” id. at 989.  See 
also Parmet, Health Care, supra note 89, at 270 (noting that constitutional cases dealing with health 
care all “question the relationship between the body politic and individuals who are facing the 
reality of physical vulnerability and, ultimately, biological mortality”). 
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Carhart I.229  Like Nebraska’s ban in Carhart I, however, the federal ban 
lacks a health exception.230  In its place, Congress put a series of findings 
explaining why no health exception is necessary.  Those findings include 
medical statements, such as the statements that “[t]here is no credible medi-
cal evidence that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer than other 
abortion procedures,” that “[n]o controlled studies of partial-birth abortions 
have been conducted nor have any comparative studies been conducted to 
demonstrate its safety and efficacy compared to other abortion methods,” and 
that “there have been no articles published in peer-reviewed journals that es-
tablish that partial-birth abortions are superior in any way to established 
abortion procedures.”231  They also include judgments such as that “[a] 
moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a 
partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never 
medically necessary and should be prohibited,”232 as well as legal conclu-
sions supporting the necessity of deference to Congress by the federal courts 
in reviewing the PBABA.233 
Justice Kennedy, who strongly dissented in Carhart I, wrote the 
majority opinion for a newly reconstituted Court in Carhart II, this time 
upholding the ban.  Although the case has been met with consternation by 
pro-choice advocates and has been viewed as a shocking reversal of the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding doctrine with respect to abortion rights,234 
what is perhaps most surprising—at least considering the author of the opin-
ion and the result—is the judicial modesty with which the Supreme Court 
ultimately acted in turning away the constitutional challenge. 
The Court, upholding the PBABA in Carhart II, held first that the ban 
was written more precisely than the ban in Carhart I and therefore, in clearly 
restricting only D&X, was neither unconstitutionally vague nor unduly 
burdensome by prohibiting other, more common abortion procedures.235  
Second, in a clear reversal of its prior approach to abortion cases—including 
that taken in Carhart I—the Court held that the absence of a health exception 
did not require invalidation of the PBABA on its face.236  Nonetheless, the 
Court did not explicitly overrule Carhart I, nor did it distinguish the prior 
case.  Instead, the Court shed doubt on Carhart I’s demanding evidentiary 
standard for government attempts to regulate abortion procedures in a way 
 
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 & Supp. V 2006). 
230. See id. 
231. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(B), 117 Stat. 1201, 
1204. 
232. Id. § 2(1). 
233. Id. § 2(3)–(12). 
234. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, New Justices, New Rules: The Supreme 
Court Upholds the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, FINDLAW’S WRIT, May 1, 
2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070501_mcclain.html. 
235. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2007). 
236. Id. at 1632; id. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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that may impose health risks,237 while still assuming that a regulation of abor-
tion would be unconstitutional if it imposes significant health risks on the 
woman238 and leaving the door open for future as-applied challenges to abor-
tion regulations lacking a health exception.239 
The Court’s reasoning and language often resembled the analytic 
structure of the public-health line of cases.  For example, in language aptly 
criticized as paternalistic or worse, the Court, admittedly relying on “no reli-
able data,” spoke of some women suffering psychological harm when they 
“regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained.”240  The Court apparently reasoned that women might not know 
what really happens in a D&X abortion; that if they did know, many of them 
would not choose it or would later come to severely regret having chosen it; 
and therefore that the government may outlaw the procedure altogether for 
women’s own good.241  Such language, which suggests that the individual 
may be restricted in her liberty not only for society’s greater good but also 
for her own good, is the quintessential talk of public-health protection.242 
In addition, the Court at times appeared to behave as though the relevant 
standard to be applied in reviewing abortion restrictions were the rational 
basis standard, as if no particular constitutional right were at stake, rather 
than the heightened “undue burden” standard introduced by Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.  Thus, the Court held: 
The government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show 
its profound respect for the life within the woman. . . .  Where it has a 
rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State 
 
237. Id. at 1638 (majority opinion). 
238. Id. at 1635. 
239. Id. at 1638–39; see also id. at 1651–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
240. Id. at 1634 (majority opinion); see, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for 
Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 
815, 837–38 (2007) (describing Justice Ginsburg’s criticism of the majority’s decision based on its 
disrespect for women’s autonomy). 
241. See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1648–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution the Court 
approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately . . . .  Instead, 
the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their 
safety.”). 
242. See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 91, 90–91 (noting that paternalistic regulation is 
sometimes justified by the fact that “individuals have cognitive limits;” that is, they “frequently 
make choices without full information about the risks”); cf. Siegel, supra note 240, at 837–38 
(discussing the “woman-protective” language in Carhart II); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of 
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
991, 1030 (observing, prior to Carhart II, that some “woman-protective” abortion restrictions were 
justified in the “language of public health (i.e., abortion is a bad choice)”).  Carhart II’s language 
may be contrasted with the antipaternalistic tone struck by the Court in Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 374, 374–75 (2002) (rejecting as invalid the Government’s concern 
“that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information about” certain prescription 
drugs).  Although that case dealt with regulation of prescription drugs—a traditional area of public-
health concern—the Court struck down Congress’s restrictions on advertising of compound drugs 
under the First Amendment.  Id. 
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may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute 
others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the 
medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life 
of the unborn.243 
On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the Court was 
not actually applying the rational basis standard to this particular abortion 
restriction.  Rather, the rational basis language appears in the section of the 
opinion in which the Court considered whether the PBABA had the purpose, 
as opposed to the effect, of imposing an undue burden on women seeking 
abortions.  As such, the rational basis language refers to the Court’s view that 
the government had a rational purpose or reason for acting as it did—namely, 
“protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” by showing 
“respect for the dignity of [fetal] human life”—and that it therefore was not 
acting with the purpose of imposing an undue burden.244  Moreover, the 
“rational basis” language is accompanied by the “undue burden” language in 
the very same sentence. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Court appeared to take a substantially 
more deferential approach to Congress’s findings than it had taken to 
Nebraska’s view of medical facts in Carhart I.  The Court insisted, as had 
Justice Kennedy in his Carhart I dissent,245 that “[m]edical uncertainty does 
not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any 
more than it does in other contexts.”246  It then equivocated, however, stating, 
“Although we review congressional factfinding under a deferential standard, 
we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight on Congress’ 
findings.”247  Perhaps most surprisingly, in the very next sentence, the Court 
asserted that it “retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual 
findings where constitutional rights are at stake,”248 thus citing the 
“constitutional fact” doctrine, which has not been consistently applied 
outside the context of the First Amendment’s free-speech protections.249  Af-
ter noting that some of the congressional findings were simply incorrect, the 
Court then concluded that “[u]ncritical deference to Congress’ factual find-
ings in these cases [was] inappropriate.”250  Moreover, although it did not 
give the plaintiffs’ evidence as much weight as it had in Carhart I, it is 
 
243. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. 
244. Id.  Indeed, the Court began part IV of its opinion by explaining that the PBABA would be 
unconstitutional if it had either the purpose or the effect of imposing an undue burden on women 
seeking abortions.  Id. at 1632.  Part IV(A) proceeds to analyze the purpose prong, whereas part 
IV(B) analyzes the effects prong.  Id. at 1632–35. 
245. See Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 968 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
246. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1637. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. See, e.g., Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1453 (2001) (“The area of the law to which the 
doctrine of constitutional fact has been most consistently applied is the First Amendment.”). 
250. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
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noteworthy that the Court at least considered conflicting testimony presented 
by the parties’ experts, as it had declined to do in OCBC.251  The Court can 
therefore be said to have taken a more deferential approach to legislative 
facts than in Carhart I, but not as deferential as in OCBC. 
Indeed, the key to understanding the Court’s approach to Congress’s 
findings of fact is perhaps contained in this sentence: “The medical 
uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health risks 
provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does 
not impose an undue burden.”252  In other words, the Court concluded that a 
facial challenge to the law was a particularly inappropriate setting for sorting 
out the medical facts, as compared to an as-applied challenge—including a 
preenforcement as-applied challenge—in which the plaintiffs could present 
evidence showing that “in discrete and well-defined instances a particular 
condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the 
Act must be used.”253  As such, the Court avoided deciding what degree of 
deference to Congress’s findings of medical fact was appropriate; it simply 
decided that the factual issues would have to be sorted out in a different case, 
presented in a different procedural posture. 
Finally, Carhart II modified the holding of Carhart I in a significant 
way: in addition to doing away with Carhart I ’s evidentiary standard, in 
which the government largely bears the burden of demonstrating that its 
abortion regulation will not threaten women’s health, the Court analyzed the 
need for a health exception under the “undue burden” rubric, rather than 
treating it as a separate and independent constitutional requirement.254  Al-
though some language in Casey could be read to suggest that the health 
exception was subject to undue burden analysis, the consensus had previ-
ously been that the health exception was a freestanding constitutional 
requirement.255  By subjecting the health exception to undue burden analysis, 
in which the burden is on the challenger to show that the abortion regulation 
puts a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions, the Court 
allows less discretion to physicians and most likely denies D&X procedures 
to women who need it for reasons that the courts would not deem sufficiently 
weighty.256 
 
251. Id. at 1635. 
252. Id. at 1637 (emphasis added). 
253. Id. at 1638.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent takes issue with the notion that such evidence 
cannot be dealt with in a facial challenge, and she notes that the record in the instant case contained 
detailed discussions of such medical conditions and the risk that would result from using an 
alternate procedure.  Id. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
254. See id. at 1637 (majority opinion) (“The medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s 
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack 
that the Act does not impose an undue burden.”). 
255. See supra note 60. 
256. Cf. Borgmann, supra note 71, at 699–700 (discussing the potential negative effects of 
language in Casey that “seemed to subsume the medical emergency exception within the undue 
burden test”). 
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Ultimately, while Carhart II clearly changed the abortion-rights 
landscape in important ways, it also left some important aspects of the law 
unchanged.  Carhart II may be read to acknowledge that a health exception 
is still required for abortion regulations to the extent that they can be shown 
by one party’s medical evidence to impose significant health risks for certain 
women.  In addition, Carhart II ’s preference for as-applied challenges 
should not be understood to foreclose all but the most unlikely challenges—
those by individual women with pressing health reasons for needing the 
D&X procedure.  Rather, the Court made it clear that the medical issues 
could still be considered in the context of preenforcement as-applied 
challenges.257  Of course, one might, like Justice Ginsburg, question exactly 
what such a preenforcement as-applied challenge would look like or how it 
would meaningfully differ from the instant facial challenge.  Presumably, 
such a challenge would be brought by physicians claiming that they needed 
to use the D&X procedure in particular circumstances, such as where the 
woman suffers from cancer and preeclampsia, or in cases of fetal 
hydrocephaly.258  The plaintiffs would then presumably be given the 
opportunity to present medical evidence, such as expert testimony and 
medical-journal articles, much like what was already contained in the record 
in Carhart II, demonstrating that the procedure is necessary in those circum-
stances to avoid significant risks to the health of the woman.  The court could 
then issue an injunction against the law as applied to women with particular 
health conditions, for example, but the court could not strike down the law on 
its face. 
Yet if this is what the Court hopes for, and if the heart of the issue is 
thus simply one of remedy—of the form that the injunction will take—it is 
unclear why such an injunction could not have been issued in the original 
Carhart II litigation.259  In any case, such a lawsuit would not result in courts 
 
257. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1638 (“The Government has acknowledged that preenforcement, 
as-applied challenges to the Act can be maintained.  This is the proper manner to protect the health 
of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition 
has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.” (citation 
omitted)). 
258. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-380) 
(discussing a hypothetical as-applied challenge based on the necessity of the D&X procedure to 
treat preeclampsia); see also Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 929 (2000) (“The 
materials presented at trial referred to the potential benefits of the D&X procedure in circumstances 
involving nonviable fetuses, such as fetuses with abnormal fluid accumulation in the brain 
(hydrocephaly).”). 
259. Perhaps this reading of Carhart II, which takes the Court’s language at face value, is 
overly optimistic.  In Casey, the Court declined to strike down a law imposing a twenty-four-hour 
waiting period, and the plurality emphasized that the particular record before the district court had 
been insufficient.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).  There was, 
however, extensive evidence in the record of the requirement’s unduly burdensome nature.  See 
Borgmann, supra note 71, at 683 & n.62.  Moreover, although Justice Blackmun, in dissent, took 
comfort in the notion that the Court had left open the possibility of future challenges on a different 
or more complete record, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 926, 938 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), no waiting-period law has ever been permanently struck down by the federal 
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deferring more to legislative judgments about medical issues; rather, it would 
ironically involve courts further in deciding and weighing medical questions, 
rather than leaving it to physicians to decide when a procedure is medically 
necessary.  Nonetheless, taking the Carhart II majority at its word indicates 
that abortion regulations must still be lifted when they impose significant 
health risks on the woman; the means of achieving that result must simply be 
more procedurally modest and incremental than in the past.260 
IV. Healing the Body of Doctrine 
A. Some Nonexplanations 
What, then, explains the different approaches taken by the Supreme 
Court regarding the right to make autonomous medical treatment decisions?  
Before attempting to describe what accounts for this difference, it will prove 
helpful first to set out several doctrinal explanations that have some surface 
appeal but ultimately fail to meaningfully differentiate the autonomy cases 
from the public-health cases.  I ultimately conclude that the Supreme Court 
has largely decided whether to apply deference or heightened scrutiny in a 
given case without any logical consistency, perhaps based largely on superfi-
cial determinations about what “category” the case falls into. 
The first and most obvious possibility is that in the autonomy cases, a 
fundamental or quasi-fundamental constitutional right is involved, whereas 
no such right is involved in the public-health cases; indeed, some of the latter 
cases even arise in the context of criminal activity, such as the use of 
marijuana.  On closer examination, however, this argument proves incorrect, 
if not question begging.  The very issue in each of these cases is whether the 
individual has a right to access a particular medical treatment without gov-
ernment intervention.  Although the constitutional right to individual 
autonomy in the form of avoiding unwanted motherhood certainly figures 
into the abortion and contraception cases, it is possible to separate that gen-
eral right from the right that motivated the Court in Roe to hold (and to 
continue to assume) that a health exception is required whenever the state 
regulates abortion, previability or postviability, in a way that may impose 
significant health risks.  Indeed, Eugene Volokh has recently argued that the 
abortion right actually consists of two different rights—a “right to abortion as 
reproductive choice” and a right to “medical self-defense,” which he defines 
 
courts after Casey.  There is thus reason to believe that a subsequent as-applied challenge to a D&X 
ban would meet the same fate.  Additionally, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out at oral argument, it 
may not always be possible to generalize about the situations in which a health exception is needed; 
sometimes it may depend on the particular woman’s overall health picture, or on the doctor’s skill 
and comfort level with certain procedures.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 258, at 23–24. 
260. Cf. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–32 (2006) (seeking 
a narrowly crafted remedy on remand rather than invalidating a New Hampshire abortion regulation 
statute in its entirety). 
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as “a right to defend oneself using medical care, even when this requires de-
stroying the source of the threat.”261 
Thus, the right at stake in Carhart I and II is different from the right to 
reproductive choice.  As explicated in Casey, the right to choose an abortion 
is most commonly understood as a right to be free from government intrusion 
into certain “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”262  When 
the state consigns a woman to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term, it sub-
jects her not only “to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear,” but also to limitations on her ability to participate fully in 
society, potential emotional anguish, and long-term, if not lifelong, 
emotional, moral, and financial ties and responsibilities.263  Carhart I and II, 
however, are not about the right to choose an abortion but rather the method 
by which the abortion will be performed.  Thus, it is no answer to say that in 
one case a constitutional right is involved and in another no such right is 
involved.  The abortion cases present the same issue as the public-health 
cases: whether individuals have the right, in consultation with a physician, to 
protect their health and to make medical treatment choices without unwar-
ranted government interference. 
A second and related possibility is that the autonomy cases, particularly 
the contraception and abortion cases that comprise the bulk of them, are not 
concerned with the right to protect one’s health per se but with the 
unconstitutionality of requiring only women to risk their health in 
circumstances where people are generally not required to do so.  Susan 
Frelich Appleton has observed that “the law never asks the parent of a child 
to provide, say for example, a kidney or bone marrow for transplantation 
even if the child would die without the donation, because even recognized 
duties to rescue steer clear of such physical invasions and risks”; it is thus a 
devaluation of women and a denial of their equality to require them to bear 
the considerable physical strain and risk of even a normal pregnancy solely 
for the sake of the fetus.264  Nor, by extension, would it be constitutional to 
require women to undergo a riskier method of abortion when, in general, 
individuals are not so constrained in their medical choices. 
 
261. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment 
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1824 (2007).  Volokh also notes that a woman possesses this 
right even when her health—and not her life—is at stake.  Id. at 1824 n.53. 
262. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see Cruz, supra note 179, at 313–14 (describing Casey as offering 
“a better explication of [the abortion] right’s constitutional foundation”). 
263. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 852–53. 
264. Susan Frelich Appleton, Unraveling the “Seamless Garment”: Loose Threads in Pro-Life 
Progressivism, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 294, 299, 299–300 (2005).  Others have made this argument, 
perhaps most famously Judith Jarvis Thomson.  See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 
1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).  I am indebted to Professor Appleton for encouraging me to address 
this line of argument. 
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Undoubtedly much of the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence can 
be illuminated by this perspective.  But I maintain that the wide-angle view I 
take in this Article demonstrates precisely why it is not a sufficient 
explanation.  Placing the abortion and contraception cases in a broader 
context demonstrates that the government can and does limit individuals’ 
medical treatment choices in a variety of situations, even when the 
individual, her physician, and some considerable portion of the medical 
community believe that the prohibited treatment is the safest and most effec-
tive for the patient.  In other words, the courts have upheld regulations on 
medical treatment, applying equally to both sexes, that are arguably at least 
as restrictive and harmful as bans on particular abortion methods.  
Conversely, although many of the autonomy cases are abortion or 
contraception cases, challenging restrictions on medical practices that affect 
only women, not all of those cases are abortion or contraception cases.  The 
implications of Glucksberg apply to state regulations on medical treatment 
that burden both sexes equally.  Again, the courts are not necessarily con-
cerned exclusively, or primarily, with regulations that burden only one sex. 
A third attempt to distinguish the two kinds of cases might be to focus 
on the government interests involved.  Indeed, the term “public-health law” 
traditionally implies a limitation on individual freedom in order to promote 
the public good (usually the health and welfare of others).265  The public-
health cases fit that definition nicely, emphasizing the government’s need to 
act in the interest of the public health and safety over the individual’s 
interests.  Thus, one might argue that the public-health cases involve threats 
to the health of others, and therefore the public good, in a way that the auton-
omy cases generally do not.  Put differently, the public-health cases involve 
negative externalities that go beyond the individual patient.266 
Admittedly, the government’s interest in combating the scourge of 
illegal drug use, for example, along with the violence, crime, and public-
health problems it entails, may be considered quite powerful, as well as 
different in kind from the harm of a medical treatment like aggressive and 
 
265. See GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 85 (“Public health regulation entails potential trade-offs 
between public goods and private interests.”); cf. Burris, supra note 90, at 933 (defining “public 
health law” broadly as “cases concerning state action taken in the name of preventing ill health or 
promoting good health”). 
266. Cf. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886).  Tiedeman 
articulated the limitations of the state’s police powers in the public health context as follows: 
[T]he police power of the State can never be exercised in favor of, or against any 
system of medicine.  The police power can be brought to bear upon quacks, and 
disreputable practitioners, to whichever school they may belong, but when reputable 
and intelligent members of the profession differ in theories of practice, the State has no 
power to determine which of them, if either, is wrong. 
Id. 
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life-shortening palliative care, which is limited to the individual.267  But the 
autonomy-oriented abortion cases hold that the state’s interest in preserving 
viable fetuses is also a compelling one.  Whether this last interest may be 
categorized as affecting the “public good,” in the traditional public-health 
sense of the term, or as regulating an “externality” in economic terms is per-
haps a philosophical question beyond the scope of this Article.  Most likely, 
the concepts of externalities, public good, and harm to others are ultimately 
far too vague and malleable to be of much help in explaining the two sepa-
rate lines of cases.  In any case, it seems, at least from a constitutional 
perspective, that the state interests articulated in autonomy cases, such as 
Roe, are no less important than the public-health interests that lie behind the 
Laetrile and medical-marijuana cases. 
Moreover, at least until Carhart II, the Supreme Court rarely indicated 
that its decisions hinged on the merits of the asserted governmental 
interests.268  The majority in Carhart I, following Roe, did not even mention 
the asserted state interests in its analysis of the health-exception requirement.  
It never suggested it was engaging in any sort of balancing of government 
interests; rather, it categorically held that in the face of a judicial finding that 
the procedure may avoid certain health risks, or at least a division of opinion 
over whether this is so, “the law requires a health exception.”269  Likewise, 
those courts that considered whether individuals have a right to access 
marijuana for medicinal purposes categorically rejected the existence of such 
a right and did not engage in balancing of the government’s interest in 
controlling illegal drug use against the individual’s autonomy interest.270  
 
267. See, e.g., Asa Hutchinson, An Effective Drug Policy to Protect America’s Youth and 
Communities, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 454–56 (2003) (detailing some of the harms resulting 
from illegal drugs).  But cf. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“It is 
unreasonable to believe that use of medical marijuana by this discrete population for this limited 
purpose will create a significant drug problem.”); Noah, supra note 42, at 57 (suggesting that the 
FDA may be overly concerned about patients’ use of controlled substances, as when it has approved 
painkillers with serious and potentially fatal side effects because they will substitute for narcotics 
that would otherwise be prescribed).  One might also argue that it is the prohibition of drugs, and 
not the drugs themselves, that leads to violence and crime. 
268. But see Meyer, supra note 74, at 1171, 1171–72 (arguing that the Court’s opinion in 
Carhart I “must rest upon a[n] . . . unstated judgment about the relative weight of the competing 
interests”). 
269. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000). 
270. E.g., United States v. Osburn, No. C 02-939 AHM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8607, at *5–6 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2003) (“Defendants have not established that they have any protected, 
fundamental right to the choice of a particular treatment or medicine.”); Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. 
Supp. 2d 918, 927–28 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“While plaintiffs may vehemently disagree with the 
wisdom of the federal government’s determination that marijuana has no medical efficacy . . . they 
do not have a fundamental, constitutional right to obtain and use it for treatment.”); United States v. 
Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at *2, *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
25, 1999) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to obtain medication free from the lawful exercise of 
the government’s police powers.”). 
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Perhaps Glucksberg and Carhart II can be read to call for such balancing;271 
and in fact, a genuine balancing of interests, rather than a short-circuiting of 
the analysis through deference, is precisely what I argue is needed in these 
cases. 
Perhaps, then, a fourth distinction might be drawn: one might point to 
the differing degrees of scientific support for one medical intervention over 
another.  Courts may be more inclined to find a right to access a medical 
treatment when there is substantial evidence supporting that treatment and to 
reject the claims of constitutional right when the medical support for the 
treatment is weak.  After all, many of the public-health cases involved chal-
lenges to very well-supported medical judgments by the government: there 
was little evidence contradicting the efficacy and safety of vaccines or rec-
ommending the use of Laetrile, for example.  On the other hand, the Court in 
Carhart I specifically required, and found, substantial evidence to support 
the medical necessity of D&X.272 
As I argue below, it is perfectly sensible for courts to take into account 
the degree of scientific consensus supporting a given intervention before 
granting individuals access to it; and indeed, this may be what courts have by 
and large tried to do.  But they have gone about it in a very strange way.  
Rather than recognizing that a constitutional right is implicated whenever the 
government takes certain medical treatment choices off the table and then 
considering whether there are nonetheless sufficiently important government 
interests to override that right, courts in the public-health cases have deferred 
to legislatures without considering the strengths of the claimants’ evidence 
and have used that deference to hold that no constitutional right exists at all, 
rather than deciding whether the constitutional right is outweighed by coun-
tervailing government interests.  In the medical-marijuana cases, for 
example, courts refused even to consider the defendants’ considerable evi-
dence concerning the medical benefits of cannabis, instead deferring in 
almost automatic fashion to Congress’s finding to the contrary and holding 
that no constitutional right was implicated.  And Chief Justice Burger in 
Eisenstadt refused to accept the notion that the state should be required to 
support its public-health decisions at all.273  Thus, although the degree of 
 
271. See also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
469 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that 
the court, in recognizing terminally ill plaintiffs’ right to choose certain medications, has not 
“prejudge[d] whether the FDA policy challenged here outweighs the Alliance members’ interests in 
self-determination; we require further inquiry by the district court on remand as to the FDA’s 
countervailing interests”); Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“[T]he claimed 
fundamental right is to attempt to preserve one’s life; whether the risks associated with doing so 
justify restraining that right is properly considered only after the right is deemed fundamental.”). 
272. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 937 (“[A] significant body of medical opinion believes [the] 
procedure may bring with it greater safety for some patients and explains the medical reasons 
supporting that view . . . .”). 
273. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 468 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief Justice 
argued: 
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medical evidence supporting a particular intervention may explain some of 
the outcomes, it does not explain the reasoning of the relevant cases.274 
B. The Right to Make Medical Treatment Choices: Existence of the Right 
In the final subparts of this Article, I build on the insights developed so 
far to draw two conclusions: first, that the Supreme Court has already 
recognized a substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment 
choices, which is related to but independent of other kinds of autonomy 
rights; and second, that courts have avoided recognizing and properly 
analyzing this right by automatically applying deference to legislative 
judgments in cases that they view as public-health cases.  The extent to 
which courts should defer to such legislative determinations of medical fact 
is a question that has therefore largely gone unaddressed, but which I argue 
should be confronted head-on.  I conclude by arguing that deference may be 
inappropriate when pure questions of medical or scientific fact are involved, 
but that in any case, courts must be more systematic in both recognizing the 
right to make medical treatment choices and in balancing that right against 
countervailing government interests in light of the available scientific 
evidence.  I also suggest that Carhart II may provide a template for how the 
Court could analyze claims of a right to make medical treatment choices in 
the future. 
An important contention of this Article, and the inevitable conclusion to 
be drawn from my review of the case law, is thus that the Supreme Court has 
already recognized a substantive-due-process right to make medical 
treatment decisions without unwarranted government interference.  The 
contours of this right vary from case to case.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has sometimes articulated a near-absolute immunity from government 
intervention in medical treatment choices—as in Carhart I, Griswold, and 
Botsford, in which the Court never suggested that any governmental interest 
would be sufficient to override the plaintiff’s bodily integrity right—but has 
 
It is possible, of course, that some members of the Massachusetts Legislature desired 
contraceptives to be dispensed only through medical channels in order to minimize 
their use, rather than to protect the health of their users, but I do not think it is the 
proper function of this Court to dismiss as dubious a state court’s explication of a state 
statute absent overwhelming and irrefutable reasons for doing so. 
Id. 
274. Another possibility is that the Court has treated drugs differently from surgical 
interventions, perhaps because of the FDA’s authority to regulate drugs or because of the view that 
regulating surgical interventions intrudes too much into the doctor–patient relationship.  As several 
commentators have noted, surgery is subject to far less legal regulation than drugs.  See, e.g., Amer 
S. Ahmed, Note, The Last Twist of the Knife: Encouraging the Regulation of Innovative Surgical 
Procedures, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1530–32, 1532 n.17 (2005) (citing sources comparing 
surgery regulation with drug regulation).  It is not apparent that there is any good reason behind this 
discrepancy, however.  See id. at 1531 (describing the difference in treatment as “a legal oddity”).  
In addition, at least some kinds of drugs, such as contraceptives and perhaps drugs needed for 
aggressive palliative care, have been treated by the Supreme Court under the autonomy line of cases 
and thus as subject to more limited government regulation. 
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sometimes suggested that bodily integrity is a right that must be balanced 
against legitimate governmental interests, as in Glucksberg and Carhart II.  
Nevertheless, the assumption that some such right exists has been somewhat 
more consistent.  Eugene Volokh has recently pointed to the existence of a 
right of “medical self-defense,” which, he argues, has its roots in the tradi-
tional common law right of self-defense275—a right to which even Justice 
Scalia might grant constitutional status.276  Likewise, John Robertson has 
recently made the argument that one can discern a negative constitutional 
right to medical treatment in substantive-due-process case law.277  Indeed, 
even Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the original public-health case, recognized 
the necessity of a health exception to actions otherwise within the state’s po-
lice power; even Gonzales v. Carhart assumed that abortion regulations 
imposing substantial health risks would be unconstitutional; and even the en 
banc opinion in Abigail Alliance left open the possibility that individuals 
might have a constitutional right to access safe and effective medical treat-
ments that could save their lives.278 
In the medical-marijuana and Laetrile cases, the Supreme Court did not 
so much squarely reject the existence of such a right as dodge the question 
entirely.  Indeed, although the lower courts in the Laetrile cases declined to 
recognize a constitutional right to access a particular drug, they did suggest 
in dicta that there was a right to access some medical treatment.279  But if 
courts, even in the public-health cases, are willing to recognize a right to ac-
cess medical treatment in general, it is hard to see how they can avoid 
recognizing a right to access a particular medical treatment, especially when 
the treatment sought is the safest or only effective one.  Finally, Whalen v. 
 
275. Volokh, supra note 261, at 1815–18. 
276. See id. at 1818 & n.17 (noting that Justice Scalia authored a plurality opinion suggesting 
that there is a substantive-due-process right to self-defense (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 
37, 56 (1996) (plurality opinion))). 
277. John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: Constitutional Issues in the 
Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7–15.  This Article, too, argues only that 
there is a negative, not positive, right to make medical treatment choices—that is, it asserts that 
there is a right against government interference with medical decision making but does not mean to 
suggest that there is a right to have government-financed access to medical treatment.  On the 
distinction between negative and positive rights, see Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 206, 206–07 (2006) (distinguishing between “barriers to government 
action” and “entitlements to government protection”). 
278. See also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006) (noting 
that the state did not dispute the constitutional requirement that minors have access to abortion 
when necessary to preserve their life or health); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Surprisingly 
Unanimous Abortion Decision: A Parting Gift for Justice O’Connor?, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Jan. 30, 
2006, http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20060130.html (arguing, in discussing Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood, that a minor woman “has a constitutional right to be free of state regulation that 
effectively subjects her to a serious risk of losing a limb,” suggesting that even Justices Scalia and 
Thomas might agree, and further observing that even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, there would 
still be a genuine constitutional question of whether an abortion prohibition without a health 
exception would be constitutional). 
279. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
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Roe alluded, albeit ambiguously, to the “right to decide independently, with 
the advice of [a] physician, to acquire and to use needed medication.”280  It is 
therefore not necessary to argue that the Supreme Court should recognize a 
new right—as it is in any case unlikely to do281—to believe that neither the 
initial D.C. Circuit panel in Abigail Alliance nor the plaintiffs before the 
Ninth Circuit on remand in Raich were on completely shaky ground.282 
To recognize that individuals possess a constitutional right to protect 
their health by making autonomous medical treatment decisions is not, by 
any means, to decide that the right is a trump card and that states are 
powerless to withhold drugs from the market, regulate the practice of 
medicine, or prosecute quacks.283  First, those wishing to challenge govern-
ment action would most likely have to show that the government action 
actually burdens the constitutional right to make medical treatment 
choices.284  Thus, a criminal prohibition on using marijuana, even for 
 
280. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). 
281. See Mariner et al., supra note 107, at 587 (“During the past decade, the Court has been 
reluctant to recognize constitutional protection for new aspects of liberty.”); Brian Hawkins, Note, 
The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 409, 428–29, 430 (2006) (concluding, from a review of cases citing Glucksberg and 
Lawrence, that there is a strong judicial reluctance to recognize new constitutional rights).  Other 
commentators have made the argument that the Court should recognize an individual substantive-
due-process right to access specific medical treatments, such as medical marijuana or treatments 
resulting from embryonic-stem-cell research.  See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 277, at 7–15 (arguing 
that there is a constitutional right to access embryonic-stem-cell-derived medical therapies); 
Matthew Segal, Note, Overdue Process: Why Denial of Physician-Prescribed Marijuana to 
Terminally Ill Patients Violates the United States Constitution, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235, 237 
(1998) (arguing that laws denying medicinal marijuana “violate[] the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”); Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive 
Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1985 
(2005) (“[A] law completely banning the use of marijuana will, as applied to some patients, infringe 
upon an array of fundamental rights . . . .”). 
282. Perhaps the fact that courts generally apply the overly formalistic analysis set out in 
Glucksberg, according to which they must both engage in a “careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno 
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)), and determine whether that interest is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,” id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 
(1977)), and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937)), generally resulting in a very narrow view of the rights that are protected by 
substantive due process, has caused courts to overlook the right to autonomy in medical treatment 
choices that clearly runs through Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Interestingly, courts have continued 
to apply the Glucksberg analysis, although the Supreme Court apparently abandoned it in Lawrence 
v. Texas.  See generally Hawkins, supra note 281, at 411 (chronicling the lower courts’ continued 
application of the Glucksberg test in 102 cases decided since Lawrence). 
283. Nor, as I discuss below, does it mean that the FDA’s authority must be decimated or that 
drug manufacturers will be free to stimulate demand without regulation.  But see Peter D. Jacobson 
& Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. von 
Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 207 (2007) (“If access to experimental drugs is considered a 
fundamental right, the FDA’s regulatory authority is inevitably diminished, as is its ability to 
conduct premarket review of new pharmaceuticals for safety and effectiveness.”). 
284. The notion of “burden” as part of the substantive-due-process analysis is familiar from 
Casey, which instituted the “undue burden” standard for determining when a government regulation 
actually strikes at the heart of the abortion right.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
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medicinal purposes and pursuant to a physician’s prescription, probably 
burdens the right; a requirement that medical cannabis users place their 
names in a national registry probably does not.285  Second, the challengers 
would have to overcome any asserted government interest capable of out-
weighing their right.  At least in this scenario, however, individuals could 
challenge even traditional public-health regulations and force the government 
to come forward with some evidence to support its medical judgments when 
there is reason to doubt their validity. 
Given this framework, it seems that much of the problem addressed in 
this Article comes down to one of deference.  Courts apply deference in the 
public-health cases as a way of short-circuiting the constitutional analysis of 
whether and when individuals possess a right to access certain medical 
treatments.286  If such a right does exist, however, the question of deference 
does not disappear—it simply becomes important at a different stage of the 
analysis: either in determining whether the individual right is actually bur-
dened or in determining whether any state interests outweigh the claimant’s 
right. 
C. To Defer or Not to Defer 
Although legislative facts have probably always played a role in 
constitutional adjudication, the debate over the extent to which courts should 
defer to legislative findings of fact may be traced back at least to the early 
twentieth century.287  Disagreement was manifest in Lochner-era cases 
between Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, who dissented in 
 
833, 874 (1992).  In addition, the notion of burden, or “magnitude of the disadvantage,” has long 
played an important role, sometimes acknowledged and sometimes unacknowledged, in the 
“fundamental rights” strain of equal protection analysis.  See Gary J. Simson, A Method for 
Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 673, 
673–75 (1977) (discussing cases in which the Burger Court implicitly incorporated a “magnitude of 
the disadvantage” calculus into equal protection decisions). 
285. Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–604 (holding that a registration requirement does not pose a 
serious threat to a patient’s right to make important medical decisions independently). 
286. Again, it is possible that the Glucksberg framework encourages this short-circuiting, since 
it forces courts to focus on narrowly articulating the specific constitutional right that is being 
claimed and then determining whether that right is supported by tradition and history.  In the 
context of claims to autonomy in medical treatment decisions, this process shifts focus away from 
the medical and scientific questions such as safety, efficacy, and medical necessity. 
287. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553–64 (1991).  I am here 
referring to “legislative facts,” a term famously coined by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in an 
article entitled An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. 
REV. 364 (1942).  Legislative facts, according to Davis, are “the facts which inform . . . legislative 
judgment,” in contrast to “adjudicative facts,” which are “facts concerning immediate parties—what 
the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were,” and so on.  Id. 
at 402.  Confusingly, some commentators use the term “legislative facts” interchangeably with 
“constitutional facts” when discussing constitutional cases, see, e.g., Faigman, supra, at 552–53, 
and others distinguish between the two, see, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 249, at 1434–35 (treating 
constitutional facts as a type of adjudicative fact). 
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Lochner,288 and Justices Peckham and Harlan over the necessity of deferring 
to legislatures on factual matters and on social policy more generally.289  De-
spite this long history, there has been little consistency in courts’ treatment of 
legislative facts.290  For the most part, however, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the superiority of legislatures over courts in finding facts,291 and 
the conventional wisdom holds that courts should defer to legislative fact-
finding for at least three reasons: first, that separation of powers allocates to 
legislatures the fact-dependent task of determining social policy; second, that 
democratic institutions possess more legitimacy than courts when finding 
facts; and third, that legislatures are more competent than courts at finding 
facts.292 
Thus, courts and commentators note that legislatures, unlike courts, 
have vast resources for fact gathering, including large staffs and considerable 
funds designated for precisely that purpose; subpoena power; and the ability 
to take as much time as necessary to compile all the relevant information.293  
 
288. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. 
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
289. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 287, at 559–64, 562 n.73, 564 n.86.  It is interesting to note 
that this debate in Lochner took place in the context of what was considered a “public health” 
measure. 
290. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-
YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 364 (2004) (noting that despite the 
passage of time, the Court remains inconsistent in deciding “under what circumstances [it] should 
be deferential to legislatures”). 
291. Id. 
292. Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases after 
Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2315–16 (1998).  While lack of deference is often 
associated with heightened scrutiny in constitutional doctrine and a high degree of deference with 
rational basis review, this association has not been consistent.  Thus, my argument that the right to 
make autonomous medical treatment choices is a constitutionally protected right does not 
necessarily imply a lack of deference to legislative fact-finding; this nondeference must be justified 
independently.  Compare, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–208 (1997) 
(deferring to Congressional fact-finding in an intermediate-scrutiny context), with Schad v. Borough 
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72–74 (1981) (refusing to defer to a local government’s fact-
finding where that government failed to provide evidence of harms of nude dancing).  See generally 
Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA 
L. REV. 941, 961–62 (1999) (noting that courts often defer to other decision makers even when 
fundamental rights protected by heightened scrutiny are at stake); Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting 
Questionable Abortion Information: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 16 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 25, on file with author) (asserting that 
deference to legislative fact-finding has a role in factually close issues).  Although it may well be a 
good rule that courts should not defer to legislatures whenever constitutional rights are at stake, I do 
not take a position on that question here, as it is beyond the scope of this Article.  Cf. Note, supra, at 
2316–23 (arguing that deference is inconsonant with First Amendment norms such as judicial 
primacy and the need for accurate decision making when important individual rights, requiring 
protection from the majority, are at stake).  I simply argue that such nondeference is not the current 
state of the law. 
293. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178 (2001) (noting the traditional argument that 
“Congress has numerous advantages over the courts in pursuing information.  Legislatures, as 
compared to courts, ‘have substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to effective 
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In addition, legislatures, unlike courts, are highly diverse, representative 
bodies; as such, as a matter of separation of powers and democratic theory, 
legislatures, rather than courts, should be charged with compiling, and per-
haps more importantly, evaluating the sorts of factual evidence that underlie 
the often delicate and nuanced policy choices involved.294  And whereas a 
court’s judgment is ossified in legal precedent as constituting a quasi-legal 
determination, often without any mechanism for reopening an issue of legis-
lative fact previously decided, legislatures can revisit and revise previous 
legislative decisions as necessary to adapt them to changing factual 
circumstances.295 
This model appears to emphasize the legislatures’ superiority for 
deciding so-called issues of social fact, such as economic or social-science 
matters.  But it is one thing for Congress to determine whether the states have 
engaged in widespread gender-based discrimination and stereotyping with 
respect to family-leave policies,296 or for a state legislature to determine 
whether a minimum-wage requirement is necessary to prevent exploitation of 
workers,297 and another thing entirely for a legislature to decide when and 
whether a particular abortion procedure is medically indicated or whether 
cannabis has any legitimate medical use—or for that matter, to determine the 
value of pi.298  The former determination seems to be precisely the sort that 
legislatures are qualified to make and expected to make; it inherently in-
volves not only the sorts of facts that legislatures regularly gather and 
contemplate, but also the sorts of value judgments that legislatures, unlike 
judges, are expected to make.  But there is no reason to think that legislatures 
are particularly competent to make the latter determination, and it causes 
some discomfort to imagine that such scientific determinations, unlike social-
 
information gathering and sorting.’” (quoting Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection 
and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994))); see also Philip P. Frickey 
& Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An 
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1740 (2002) (“A wide variety of resources, 
unmatched by any other legislature of the world, are at the disposal of members [of Congress] and 
their committees.”). 
294. Devins, supra note 293, at 1169–70, 1179. 
295. Id. at 1180; cf. A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 
688, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing issues of legislative fact as being decided “at the level of 
logic” and for “the nation as a whole”). 
296. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–32 (2003) (discussing the 
extensive statistical and testimonial record before Congress of widespread gender discrimination in 
family-leave policies as a basis for passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
297. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (upholding Washington’s 
minimum-wage law for women in deference to state legislative findings that the law was necessary 
for protecting the health of female workers). 
298. See Jonathan L. Entin, Innumeracy and Jurisprudence: The Surprising Difficulty of 
Counting Petition Signatures, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 223, 243 & n.55 (1993) (observing that there 
actually has been an attempt to legislate the value of pi). 
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policy determinations, would be driven by politics, value judgments, or the 
desires of the majority.299 
Yet the Supreme Court has also considered scientific questions to be 
“matters not within specialized judicial competence” and therefore within the 
competency of Congress to gather data and reach conclusions.300  As a result, 
“[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scien-
tific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts 
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation, even assuming, arguendo, that 
judges with more direct exposure to the problem might make wiser 
choices.”301  In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
stated that the Court “has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion 
to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific 
uncertainty,”302 echoing some of the sentiments in his dissent in Carhart I.303 
A number of commentators have critiqued the general notion of 
deference to legislatures.  For example, Neal Devins has suggested, drawing 
in part on public-choice theory, that legislative bodies do not always have 
incentives to engage in careful fact-finding; that legislative fact-finding is 
often driven by the political agendas of committee chairs; and that lobbyists 
know well enough to “pad” the legislative history to their advantage when 
possible.304  In addition, Devins has pointed out that while legislatures 
theoretically have the ability to modify prior policy choices based on 
changed factual circumstances, they rarely do so, due to inertia and compet-
ing claims on their time and resources.305  Daniel Solove has suggested that 
deference to other decision makers in constitutional cases seriously threatens 
the federal courts’ ability to vindicate individual rights306 and has likewise 
questioned the robustness of institutional-competence-based arguments, 
 
299. But cf. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 111, 119 (1988) (arguing that legislative fact-finding is value driven and that “this is 
true even for the hard sciences,” but acknowledging that it is “especially true for the soft sciences”). 
300. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 33, 33–34 (1976) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965)). 
301. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). 
302. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007). 
303. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 970–72 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
304. Devins, supra note 293, at 1183–84. 
305. See id. at 1184–85 (explaining that lawmakers revisit prior legislation only when there is 
organized interest group pressure to do so and that even then inertia and other obstacles often 
prevent reform); cf. Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial 
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 726–27 (1988) (arguing that adherence 
to precedent should not bind courts to follow prior cases upholding a statute when legislative facts 
previously essential to its constitutionality have changed or their falsehood has become 
demonstrable). 
306. See Solove, supra note 292, at 1015–19 (arguing that the modern bureaucratic state is by 
nature inimical to individual rights and that nondeferential judicial review is essential to correct its 
excesses). 
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particularly to the extent that they underestimate the problems of bias and 
capture by special interests.307 
Douglas Laycock has made similar arguments, specifically addressing 
legislative fact-finding on matters affecting religious rights, but in terms that 
are generally applicable and worth quoting at length: 
Legislators can do serious investigations, but they rarely do.  The 
typical Congressional hearing consists of witnesses reading prepared 
five-minute statements in panels of three or four.  Many committee 
members do not attend and those who do often wander in and out.  
Each member gets to make an opening statement and to ask five 
minutes of questions to each panel, that is, one to two minutes of 
questions and answers per witness. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The party in the minority often gets fewer than half the witnesses 
and only one week’s notice of the hearing.  No interest group is 
guaranteed the right to testify.  But anyone with enough time or 
money can lobby.  Most of the real discussions in which legislators 
“find” facts occur ex parte and off the record. . . . 
   . . . . 
. . . [O]ften [legislators] are locked into positions by ideology or 
political pressure before the hearing ever begins.  Then the hearing is a 
charade.308 
In judicial fact-finding, by contrast: 
 Each side is guaranteed a fair and equal opportunity to present its 
evidence and arguments.  Litigants may invoke the judicial process as 
of right; unlike legislators, judges cannot simply ignore questions 
presented to them.  Because each side has an advocate to marshal its 
case, it is far more likely that a judge will hear the most important 
evidence than that a Congressional committee will.  Witnesses can be 
effectively cross-examined, which is rare in legislative hearings.  
Judges are overworked just as legislators are, but in an important case 
presenting a serious constitutional question, judges can usually 
commit substantial blocks of time.  Judges do not wander on and off 
the bench while hearings continue in their absence.  All judicial 
proceedings are on the record, and ex parte contacts are forbidden.  
When a judge makes up her mind because a campaign contributor 
talks to her before the hearing begins, it is corruption; when a 
legislator does the same thing, it is business as usual.309 
 
307. See id. at 1010–14 (critiquing the factual and theoretical assumptions of the notion of 
institutional competence and similar justifications for judicial deference). 
308. Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174–75 (2007) 
(reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)). 
309. Id. at 1176. 
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All of those criticisms are applicable to legislative determinations of 
medical fact.  Yet commentators have not primarily focused on the unique 
aspects of medical fact-finding that make it even more unsuitable a subject 
for judicial deference.  To the extent that they have considered the problems 
of “scientific” legislative fact, they have primarily focused on courts’ and 
legislatures’ use of empirical social-science evidence.310  I contend, however, 
that judicial deference to legislative fact-finding is particularly inappropriate 
with respect to medical fact because the traditional reasons supporting such 
deference apply even less.311 
I argue that courts should not defer to legislative findings of medical 
fact.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the maxim that legislatures’ 
greater fact-finding ability requires that courts defer to them on disputed is-
sues of legislative fact; this view has extended beyond social facts regarding 
economic, social, or policy matters to encompass even medical and scientific 
facts.  There is, however, little reason to believe that legislatures possess—or 
exercise—superior institutional competency in the context of medical and 
scientific fact.  Thus, whatever the merits of deference to legislative fact-
finding as a general matter, it is not a desirable approach when considering 
individuals’ rights to access medical treatment. 
There is, first, reason to doubt legislatures’ superior ability to discover 
medical truth.  There is no reason to think that legislators or their staff mem-
bers possess any particular expertise in evaluating medical evidence that 
judges and their clerks lack.  While it is presumed that legislators and their 
staffers often possess backgrounds in policy and that where this background 
is lacking it may be supplemented by agencies within the legislature that 
specialize in gathering and analyzing data,312 those individuals and 
 
310. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 287, at 552–64 (discussing the role that assertions of social, 
political, and economic fact have played in the Court’s most famous cases); Timothy Zick, 
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
115, 147–53 (2003) (discussing a judicial movement toward reliance on empirical social-science 
and other data in reaction to earlier decisions relying on less measurable forms of social-science 
information). 
311. The issue of deference to legislative fact-finding also raises the question whether states are 
entitled to lesser or greater deference than the federal government, but that question is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
312. The Congressional Research Service and General Accounting Office, for example, 
conduct studies, gather data, and analyze statistics in order to report them to Congress.  See Frickey 
& Smith, supra note 293, at 1738, 1738–39 (describing “support agencies” for Congress).  But they 
do not conduct medical or scientific studies; as Professor Laycock has noted: 
Despite [legislatures’] problems, broad policy questions are better left to legislatures 
than courts. . . .  [W]ith respect to broad, multi-polar questions about how complex 
economic and social systems will respond to proposed changes in policy, no one finds 
facts very well because the facts are simply too complicated.  But such questions are 
particularly ill-suited to the judicial process, which is designed for two-sided disputes 
that can be focused on one or a few specific questions. 
Laycock, supra note 308, at 1175. 
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institutions generally do not possess any background in medical science or 
any unique expertise in analysis of medical evidence and literature.313 
As Professor Laycock pointed out, when judges are asked to evaluate 
competing medical claims, they are required, unlike legislators, to hear 
evidence from both sides, chosen by the adversaries, and to allow cross-
examination.314  They may consider amicus briefs as well, and it is signifi-
cant that amicus briefs from respected organizations, such as the American 
Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, have played important roles in the Court’s abortion decisions, 
for example.315  Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows courts to appoint inde-
pendent experts,316 and courts also make use of numerous other mechanisms, 
ranging from the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence317 to “case-management techniques like pretrial conferences to nar-
row the scientific issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts 
are subject to examination by the court, and appointment of specially trained 
law clerks or scientific special masters.”318  Of course, federal judges already 
deal with scientific evidence in a number of contexts, including medical-
malpractice, toxic-tort, and products-liability cases, and they have a frame-
work for deciding the admissibility of such evidence under Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co.319  This is not to say that courts’ treatment 
of scientific evidence has gone without criticism.320  Some may fear, for 
 
313. The National Academies (formerly the National Academy of Sciences), an independent 
entity created by congressional charter to provide technical and scientific advice, is arguably the 
equivalent of some of Congress’s other fact-gathering arms.  See The National Academies, About, 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/faq1.html.  It carries out studies primarily at the behest of 
government sponsors, but it has no funding of its own.  Id.  But it is unclear how often Congress, 
not to mention state legislatures, relies on studies conducted by the National Academies. 
314. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. 
REV. 75, 100–03 (describing the virtues of the trial process for evaluating legislative facts). 
315. See Stephen Breyer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 5 
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) (speaking favorably of the role of amicus briefs in the Supreme 
Court when scientific issues are involved).  Amicus briefs filed by medical organizations do not 
always support individuals’ claimed right to make autonomous medical treatment decisions, 
moreover.  For example, the American Medical Association (AMA) filed a brief opposing the 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 n.6 (1997) and was 
initially opposed to the liberalization of state abortion laws in the 1960s.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 142–43 (1973) (noting that the AMA Committee on Human Reproduction advocated a policy 
of opposition to induced abortion). 
316. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
317. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 315. 
318. Id. at 6. 
319. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 
(1999) (applying the general principles of Daubert to all expert testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136, 143–47 (1997) (applying Daubert principles to epidemiological expert testimony in 
the toxic-tort context). 
320. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601, 600–01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (worrying that Daubert will encourage judges to act as “amateur scientists”); 
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1114–17 (noting the longstanding 
criticisms of the use of expert evidence in common law courts).  Some critics of the Daubert 
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instance, that judicial examination of scientific issues encourages “battle[s] 
of experts” that obscure scientific truth and make relatively undisputed sci-
entific issues appear to be contested.321  But when considered in relative 
rather than absolute terms, there is no reason to think that judges are less ex-
perienced or less capable than legislatures in dealing with scientific evidence. 
In addition, one of the chief reasons for allowing legislatures to make 
findings of fact in disputed areas—that they are democratic, representative 
bodies—seems to have no applicability where issues of pure medical fact are 
concerned.322  Unlike those cases in which so-called social facts are involved, 
there is (or perhaps should be) no significant political element to the deter-
mination of medical fact.  This is a fact-finding domain in which the interest 
in public participation and legislatures’ relative institutional competency are 
at their lowest. 
Some of the recent laws passed or considered by Congress in the 
controversial realm of abortion evince such flawed fact-finding.  As Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart clearly demonstrates, the findings 
of fact supporting the federal PBABA are largely inaccurate and driven by a 
highly politicized process.323  It is one salient example of a situation in which 
the legislature proved itself less competent than the courts at managing medi-
cal fact-finding.  Congress’s scientific findings explaining why no health 
exception to the PBABA was necessary were, first, unsupported by, and of-
ten in conflict with, the underlying congressional record itself.324  Second, 
they did not contain any evidence that had not essentially been before the 
Court when it decided Carhart I;325 Congress did not update its findings in 
 
decision suggest, however, that the Daubert standard is overly conservative, favoring defendants 
over plaintiffs and excluding much relevant scientific evidence.  See Carl F. Cranor, The Dual 
Legacy of Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical: Trading Junk Science for Insidious Science, in 
RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS 120, 120 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); 
Jennifer Wolsing, Note, Daubert’s Erie Problem, 82 IND. L.J. 183, 190 (2007) (noting that the 
gatekeeping function for the trial courts created by Daubert has resulted in more exclusion of 
plaintiffs’ proposed experts than before Daubert).  See generally id. at 192 n.73 (citing criticisms of 
Daubert as conflicting with contemporary scientific standards).  There is consequently reason to 
think that plaintiffs will not be as highly advantaged by a regime of nondeference as it may initially 
appear.  Indeed, the Court remarked in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000) that Daubert 
imposes “exacting standards of reliability” on litigants.  Id. at 455. 
321. E.g., Gross, supra note 320, at 1175. 
322. Of course, on the margin, it will sometimes be difficult to determine what is a “pure” issue 
of medical or scientific fact, particularly where the issue is one of public health, which inevitably 
involves policy judgments.  But in cases where the question is whether a particular treatment is 
medically appropriate—that is, safer or more effective than the alternatives for some individuals—it 
seems that only pure medical questions are involved. 
323. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1643–44 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
324. Id. at 1644 (citing Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d  805, 1008–09 (D. Neb. 2004) and 
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
325. See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (asserting that the evidence before the 
Court in Carhart I, like the testimony on which Congress relied in passing the PBABA, revealed a 
division of medical opinion on whether women could potentially benefit from “partial-birth” 
abortions). 
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light of new medical evidence.  Finally, the factual findings mischaracterized 
both the Supreme Court’s holding in Carhart I and the current state of 
medicine.326  When faced with determining the validity of the legislative 
findings and the necessity of a health exception, the lower courts, by contrast, 
almost uniformly reached very similar scientific conclusions.  The district 
court opinions were all quite lengthy and contained thorough reviews of ex-
pert scientific evidence that were far more complete than the evidence before 
Congress when it passed the Act.327 
The proposed federal Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act (UCPA),328 
introduced in 2005 and again in 2006, is another example of similarly 
defective legislative investigation of scientific fact.  The bill essentially re-
quires abortion providers to inform women seeking abortions after twenty 
weeks’ gestation that “[t]here is substantial evidence that the process of being 
killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child pain” and to offer to admin-
ister anesthesia directly to the fetus.329  This requirement is justified by 
congressional findings that are highly misleading, if not blatantly inaccurate, 
ignoring the fact that some of the most current studies estimate that fetuses 
cannot feel pain before approximately twenty-nine weeks.330  The hearings 
on the bill, moreover, left something to be desired: Congress invited only two 
physicians, one attorney, and one medical ethicist to testify, and only the last 
 
326. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1643–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. 
Supp. 2d at 485 & n.30; Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1003–
10 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
327. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1644–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  As a point of clarification, I 
do not argue that legislatures should be required to build a legislative record or demonstrate that 
they have engaged in a particular level of deliberation before their fact-finding may be accepted by 
courts.  Such “due process lawmaking” or “on-the-record lawmaking” requirements have been 
amply and competently criticized.  See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative 
Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 160–61 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of 
legislative record review); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
80, 83–85 (2001) (attacking the Rehnquist Court’s approach to legislative history for requiring 
excessively detailed evidence in support of congressional enactments).  Rather, I contend that 
individuals challenging the constitutionality of a law restricting access to medical treatment ought to 
have the opportunity to present expert medical testimony regarding the merits of the treatment and 
that legislative findings to the contrary should receive no special deference.  Rather than blindly 
accepting unsupported legislative findings, courts should require governments to present proof 
refuting the challengers’ evidence. 
328. Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006); Unborn Child 
Pain Awareness Act of 2005, H.R. 356, 109th Cong. (2005). 
329. H.R. 6099 § 3.  There are slight differences between the 2006 version (which failed to pass 
the House) and the 2005 version (which has not been voted on), but they require the same 
information to be conveyed to the woman and recite the same findings.  For simplicity, the rest of 
this Article will refer only to the 2005 bill. 
330. See, e.g., Linda P. McKenzie, Federally Mandated Informed Consent: Has Government 
Gone Too Far?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 267, 295 (2006–2007) (discussing a study concluding that “a 
fetus cannot perceive pain until . . . around twenty-nine to thirty weeks gestational age”); Tobin, 
supra note 292 (manuscript at 29–30) (suggesting that scientific literature supports a conclusion that 
a fetus lacks the physical structures necessary to perceive pain until twenty-nine to thirty weeks’ 
gestational age). 
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of those opposed the bill.331  Congress also failed to invite any of the authors 
of a recent, important metastudy of fetal pain published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, and “[n]one of the leading fetal surgery cen-
ters were represented before the committee.”332 
D. Back to the Future: Carhart II and Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
If courts begin to recognize the existence of a right to make autonomous 
medical treatment decisions and cease deferring to legislatures on matters of 
scientific fact, what would the consequences be?  I am arguing in this Article 
for a jurisprudence that would balance government interests against the indi-
vidual claim of a right of access to a given medical treatment.  Accordingly, 
the consequence would not be to grant individuals access to particular ex-
perimental or nonapproved drugs in all cases.  Instead, the outcome would 
differ depending on the factual context.  This might mean that there would 
not be a radical shift in the results of many cases, but those results would at 
least be supported by better and more consistent reasoning. 
Of course, the cases that appear to conflict most with my proposal are 
the public-health cases.  What would become of the results in those cases if 
courts were to take seriously the notion of an individual right to make 
autonomous medical treatment choices?  In some cases, it seems that the re-
sult might, in fact, change.  Although a comprehensive examination of the 
scientific evidence regarding the safety and efficacy of various medical in-
terventions is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems that if courts were to 
recognize individuals’ rights to choose marijuana for medicinal purposes, 
considering the evidence supporting such medicinal uses on its own merits, 
and to weigh the individuals’ rights against the government interests in both 
preventing diversion to the illegal drug trade and in protecting patients’ 
health, prohibitions on medicinal use of cannabis may well turn out to be 
untenable.  Similarly, at least for certain classes of patients and certain types 
of drugs, the right to access experimental cancer drugs vindicated by the ini-
tial Abigail Alliance panel may well hold up in the face of asserted 
governmental interests.  On the other hand, those individual interests might 
be outweighed by concerns about the consequences of permitting widespread 
access to unapproved drugs, such as the possibility that it would essentially 
end clinical trials as we know them because individuals would not have an 
incentive to participate in trials where they may or may not be given the 
drug, nor would pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to conduct 
those trials if individuals have a right to access the drug anyway.333  Finally, 
 
331. McKenzie, supra note 330, at 281–82. 
332. Id. at 282–83. 
333. Susan Okie, Access Before Approval—A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 437, 437 (2006).  As the court emphasized in Abigail Alliance, a right to make 
autonomous medical treatment choices will not in all cases outweigh the countervailing government 
interests, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 
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my model would provide a framework for determining whether patients have 
a right to access future forms of therapy, such as those that may one day be 
derived from embryonic stem cells.334 
Perhaps Carhart II can be seen as gesturing toward a reconciliation of 
the public-health and autonomy lines of cases and hinting at how the right 
might be operationalized in the future.  One of the most important (and for 
some, troubling) aspects of the Carhart II opinion is that it clearly used the 
undue burden analysis to determine the necessity for a health exception to the 
PBABA.  Although the undue burden standard is less protective of women’s 
health than the apparent per se requirement of a health exception set forth in 
Carhart I, it may represent one way to unite the public-health and autonomy 
lines of cases by recognizing a right to protect one’s health while allowing 
for important governmental interests to play a significant role.  Although the 
undue burden standard itself is notoriously vague and difficult to apply, it 
seems to recognize the need for a balancing of individual constitutional rights 
against governmental interests or a weighing of the extent to which a gov-
ernmental action actually burdens those rights, or both.335  Indeed, some have 
read Jacobson v. Massachusetts to require a similar inquiry regarding public-
health regulations; that is, an inquiry as to whether the regulations are neces-
sary and proportional to the evil sought to be addressed.336 
Of course, the undue burden standard leaves much to be desired, and 
this Article’s call for balancing individual rights against governmental 
interests leaves many questions unanswered.  Perhaps one of the most 
important questions left unanswered, for example, is whether concerns for 
morality may outweigh the individual’s right to protect her health.  Lawrence 
v. Texas might suggest that state interests in enforcing moral standards are to 
be treated with great suspicion;337 Carhart II, on the other hand, shows great 
solicitude for Congress’s moral interests in “protecting the integrity and 
ethics of the medical profession” and “promot[ing] respect for . . . life of the 
 
129, 138 (2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and the interest in the viability of 
clinical trials may well be important enough to override individual patients’ rights. 
334. This Article therefore supports John Robertson’s view that embryonic-stem-cell-derived 
therapies most likely could not constitutionally be banned by states, although they could of course 
be regulated.  See Robertson, supra note 277, at 17 (concluding that no asserted state interest “is 
sufficiently robust to justify the health loss to individuals denied safe and effective ESC 
[embryonic-stem-cell] therapies” but that the FDA or other agencies can regulate the right to receive 
medical treatment “in the interest of the health and safety of patients and the community”). 
335. In other words, the undue burden standard from Casey can be understood either to require 
that any regulation burdening the right to access an abortion in a sufficiently onerous way must be 
struck down (thus emphasizing the word “burden”), or it may be read to require that regulations of 
the right to access an abortion must be struck down whenever they are not sufficiently justified (thus 
emphasizing the word “undue”).  It seems to me that both of these issues should be taken into 
account when considering whether a regulation affecting the right to make medical treatment 
choices should be upheld. 
336. E.g., GOSTIN, supra note 77, at 68–69. 
337. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
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unborn.”338  Nonetheless, an explicit balancing, combined with the proposed 
explicitly nondeferential treatment of medical legislative facts, would go a 
long way toward clarifying the analysis in cases dealing with the right to 
make medical treatment choices. 
Another lesson that may be gleaned from Carhart II is that while the 
government should not be entitled to complete deference to its findings of 
scientific fact, the burden remains with the challenger to show, in the context 
of an as-applied challenge, the necessity of a health exception in her 
particular case.  The desire to shift the evidentiary burden from the 
government to the plaintiffs, along with a concern for avoiding a remedy that 
is too sweeping,339 is arguably the driving force behind the Court’s opinion in 
Carhart II.  And recognizing an individual right to present evidence showing 
that an exception to a general rule is necessary to protect one’s health would 
give due weight to Jacobson’s language appearing to require the same.  Even 
the Ninth Circuit on remand in Raich v. Gonzales, after rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ request for an injunction preventing enforcement against them of 
the Controlled Substances Act, suggested—somewhat puzzlingly in light of 
the Supreme Court’s OCBC holding—that a medical necessity defense may 
still be available “in the context of a concrete case where a statute is alleg-
edly violated, and a specific prosecution results from the violation.”340  Of 
course, it remains to be worked out exactly how much and what sort of evi-
dence would be required in a given case.  It might be unreasonable to require 
plaintiffs to conduct studies to show medical necessity or efficacy with re-
spect to new and innovative medical treatments, especially in the absence of 
any claim or any specific findings by the government that the treatment is 
unsafe or ineffective.  On the other hand, it may be necessary to introduce 
more evidence to overcome a scientific finding embodied in a statute. 
In addition, while this argument strongly suggests that the government 
would be more limited than it currently is in its ability to ban certain medical 
therapies, particularly where evidence can be marshalled to convince courts 
of the therapies’ medical validity, it does not mean that the government 
would be powerless to impose justifiable regulations on medical practice.  
Thus, states would be free to require that a physician recommend the 
treatment for a particular patient;341 indeed, the suggestion at the beginning 
of this Article that the right to make medical treatment choices is dependent 
on physician agreement is perhaps better understood in this way—that 
physician agreement is likely to be a per se reasonable requirement in most 
 
338. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007). 
339. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 885 (1999) (arguing that “the threat of undesirable remedial consequences” may 
“motivat[e] courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those consequences”). 
340. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2007). 
341. Cf. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1056 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that while 
Texas may not limit the practice of acupuncture to licensed physicians—effectively rendering the 
treatment unavailable—the state may require a diagnosis or referral from a physician). 
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contexts.342  On the other hand, as in the abortion context, courts may gener-
ally be hostile to so-called procedure bans, in which one medically indicated 
procedure is completely prohibited.343  Of course, the determination of what 
sorts of regulations are acceptable—like the determination of whether gov-
ernmental interests outweigh the individual right to access treatment—will 
not always be clear-cut or easy.  But in this respect it is no different from the 
myriad balancing tests the federal courts are asked to apply on a regular 
basis, particularly in the substantive-due-process context. 
Unifying the analysis in this manner would not only have the advantage 
of making the Court’s jurisprudence more coherent; it would also provide a 
framework for thinking about future regulations that may arise.  Regulations 
of stem-cell therapies and therapeutic cloning are already cropping up, for 
example.  At least one state has attempted to restrict the way in which 
mifepristone (also known as the abortion drug RU-486) may be prescribed, 
and other states have proposed to take similar measures or to ban it 
altogether.344  And Professor Gillian Metzger has recently pointed out that 
abortion regulation is increasingly taking the form of administrative health 
regulations, often specifically targeting abortion providers and excluding 
providers of medically similar health-care services.345  She asserts that fram-
ing abortion regulations as health regulations makes them look more like the 
sort of economic or social legislation that receives only rational basis 
review.346  In other words, such regulations tend to be analyzed under the 
public-health model rather than the autonomy model.  Clearly, some consis-
tency of analysis would bring at least a degree of much-needed predictability 
to this area. 
A final caveat: I recognize that issues of both government interests and 
deference may be more complicated where administrative agencies, such as 
the FDA, are involved.  Administrative agencies receive deference in part 
because of their unique technical and scientific expertise and capabilities; 
they are thus situated differently from legislatures in important ways.  At the 
same time, however, there is reason to believe that even agencies, such as the 
 
342. Cf. TIEDEMAN, supra note 266, at 205 (distinguishing between legitimate state regulation 
of “quacks and disreputable practitioners” and illegitimate regulation of medical decision making by 
medical professionals). 
343. See e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I ), 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000) (striking down 
Nebraska’s “partial-birth” abortion ban in part because it prohibited certain abortion procedures); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (overturning a Missouri law 
that prohibited the use of the saline amniocentesis abortion procedure). 
344. See H.B. 126, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (regulating mifepristone); H.B. 
1038, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001) (banning mifepristone); see also CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING MEDICAL ABORTION (2003), http://www.repro 
ductiverights.org/pub_fac_medabor2.html (discussing proposed state legislation that would restrict 
medical abortion). 
345. Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 
865, 868 (2007). 
346. Id. at 868–69. 
2007] Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines 345 
 
 
FDA, are subject to the sort of capture and biased fact-finding that has af-
flicted both legislatures and other agencies.347  There is reason to believe, for 
example, that this sort of bias has played a role in the failure of medical-
marijuana advocates to complete the studies required in order to obtain FDA 
approval of marijuana for medical use.348  But the number of cases in which 
specialized agencies have actually studied a scientific issue and reached rele-
vant conclusions has been relatively small in this area.  In the Laetrile cases, 
for example, the FDA did not make the finding that Laetrile was a “new 
drug” lacking proof of safety and efficacy until well into the litigation.349  In 
OCBC and Raich, courts relied on Congress’s findings, not the FDA’s, 
regarding the absence of medical uses for marijuana.  And in the Abigail 
Alliance case, clinical trials had preliminarily found the drugs at issue to be 
safe, although more trials remained to be conducted, and the FDA had not yet 
approved the drugs for marketing.  Thus, while a more complete examination 
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, I wish to suggest that it will 
continue to arise in only a small category of cases, which may indeed warrant 
special treatment. 
V. Conclusion 
The Court’s jurisprudence touching on the right to make autonomous 
medical treatment decisions has been split between two opposing lines of 
cases.  Those two lines of cases take conflicting views of the existence of the 
right itself and of the deference due to legislatures’ medical determinations.  
The Supreme Court will eventually have to resolve the conflict, and in doing 
so, it is imperative that it avoid using superficial doctrinal categories and 
automatic deference to short-circuit its analysis.  The issue of when 
governmental interests outweigh the individual right to protect one’s health 
through making autonomous medical treatment choices is one that is not 
easily resolved, but it is worthy of the sort of serious consideration it has not 
yet received. 
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